The moment everyone has been waiting for has finally arrived—the settlement in House v. NCAA has been approved. Athletic directors, coaches, athletes, and fans have been anxiously awaiting the day where Judge Claudia Wilken would approve this settlement. And rightfully so. This settlement strikes at the core of the NCAA’s amateurism model. The NCAA has said that its rules regulating student-athlete compensation are the “standards of amateurism,” the “‘mold’ of rules providing that ‘athletes must not be paid’” to preserve the “‘character and quality” that differentiates it from professional sports.” [1] While Alston led to student-athletes being allowed to profit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL), the schools were still not allowed to make payments to the athletes. This settlement changes that. Schools will now be able to make payments directly to their athletes for use of their NIL. Understandably, this is the most notable aspect of the House settlement. However, another significant outcome of this settlement is the creation of the College Sports Commission, which is partnering with Deloitte to launch the NIL Go clearinghouse.   The NIL Go clearinghouse platform is meant to serve as a vetting process for third-party NIL deals entered into by collegiate athletes. When an athlete enters into a third-party NIL deal of $600 or more, they will be required to submit details about that agreement to the platform, which will then screen the deals based on a variety of factors. While the precise algorithm for evaluating these deals is unknown, there is some information available. When a deal is submitted, the platform will make three determinations: (1) is the third party an “associated entity” with the university, such as a booster, or a business contracted with a school like a university sponsor or apparel brand?; (2) is the deal for a “valid business purpose?”; and (3) is the deal within Deloitte’s “range of compensation” paid to similarly situated individuals? [2] While each of these determinations present their own legal issues, the third determination, seemingly a fair market value analysis, likely presents the most difficulty.   This fair market value analysis considers a number of factors, including athletic performance, an athlete’s social media reach, the market of the athlete’s school, and the reach of the school in that market. [3] While these factors seem reasonable enough to determine the fair market value of a particular deal, the issues for the NIL Go platform likely do not arise out of these factors, but out of using the fair market value analysis as a method of approving or denying NIL agreements entered into by collegiate athletes and third parties.   When an agreement is reviewed by NIL Go, it may be denied if it does not fall into the range of compensation determined by Deloitte’s algorithm. If an agreement is denied, an athlete has three options: cancel the agreement, revise and resubmit the agreement, or request arbitration. For example, if a Kansas basketball player enters into an agreement worth $2 million, but the clearinghouse has determined that the compensation range is $500,000 or below, the athlete could revise the deal and resubmit it to the clearinghouse. It is possible that Kansas could provide the remaining $1.5 million from its revenue share pool, but there are no guarantees that would occur. Disregarding any legal issues, this outcome seems blatantly unfair to the athlete. After negotiating a deal for himself, he has been told he is being paid over his fair market value, a number determined by factors completely out of his control.   Along with this unfairness, the fair market value analysis and range of compensation limitation may run into issues with antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 1 prohibits any “contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” Price fixing is considered a restraint of trade. According to the United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, price fixing is “an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or services are sold.” [4] This form of restraining trade may well be relevant to the range of compensation limitation set by the NIL Go platform. The NCAA, the College Sports Commission, and Deloitte, are essentially agreeing on a formula which determines what the fair market value, or fair price, for an athlete’s NIL is in any given deal. By rejecting deals that exceed an athlete’s fair market value, the clearinghouse effectively sets a ceiling on what the athletes can earn. This suppression of the market for collegiate athlete NIL deals appears to represent the exact behavior that antitrust laws are designed to prevent.   This fair market value “ceiling” may sound familiar—it sounds similar to salary cap rules in professional sports. However, a critical difference between professional sports and collegiate sports is the athletes’ ability to collectively bargain. In a league like the NBA, the athletes are employees represented by the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), which engages in collective bargaining with the league to determine many things, including the salary cap rules. However, collegiate athletes are not employees (yet), and thus do not have a collective bargaining agreement to set out the terms for something like the NIL Go clearinghouse.   The NIL Go clearinghouse is supposedly designed to reduce payments from booster-funded collectives to athletes disguised as NIL deals, where the athlete was providing little to no real value to the collective. This has certainly been an issue since collegiate athletes have been allowed to profit from their NIL, however, the clearinghouse may be eliminating one problem while creating another, potentially bigger problem. The effects of the NIL Go clearinghouse, and the House settlement generally, on collegiate athletics remain to be seen. What seems clear, however, is that the NCAA’s legal problems will not be going away any time soon.   Davis Bax is a rising 3L at the University of Kansas School of Law, where he is president of the Sports Law Society and the St. Thomas More Society. He can be found on LinkedIn as Davis Bax . [1] Brief for Petitioner at 27, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021) (Nos. 20-512 and 20-520). [2] Ross Dellenger, What is NIL Go, and why is it the latest subject of debate among college sports leaders? , Yahoo Sports (June 13, 2025, 7:00 AM) https://sports.yahoo.com/college-sports/article/what-is-nil-go-and-why-is-it-the-latest-subject-of-debate-among-college-sports-leaders-120028561.html [3] Id. [4] Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For , U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., 2 (2021) https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2016/01/05/211578.pdf

In May, a WNBA matchup between the Chicago Sky and the Indiana Fever, Sky star Angel Reese was reportedly targeted with racial slurs from fans in the crowd. This has led to the league's investigation and major discussion on how such situations should be handled. Though no formal outcome has occurred, the incident forces us to consider imperative questions: What obligations do leagues and arenas have to protect players from targeted abuse by fan bases? Where is the line between fans expressing emotion and engaging in actual harassment? Do we need clearer rules and/or stronger protections to ensure athletes feel safe and respected while executing their jobs? A Rivalry Set by the Media Anyone who knows about women’s basketball knows the rivalry between Caitlyn Clark and Angel Reese. Though there is competitiveness on the court, both Clark and Reese have stated how their so-called “rivalry” is more media-driven than personal. This media framework has allowed for the WNBA to receive more attention. However, this attention comes with consequences. In the 2023 NCAA Women’s Basketball Championship where Reese’s LSU defeated Clark’s Iowa, Reese made gestures towards Clark where she pointed to her ring finger once it was known that LSU would win the title. Reese was heavily criticized after this for “unsportsmanlike conduct” even though Clark made a similar gesture earlier in the tournament Since then, the media has fueled this storyline casting these two players against each other for their final colligate season in 2024 and into the WNBA. What could have remained a typical sports rivalry was instead turned into a larger cultural conversation with racial underliers. This has become one where Reese, a black female, is often cast as the “villain” in contrast to Clark, a white female, as the “hero.” That framing does not just exist in headlines or highlight reels, it shapes how fans view and treat these players, both online and in person. As we saw in the recent game between the Chicago Sky and Indiana Fever, it can fuel real-world incidents that cross the line from fandom into harassment. This media-fueled rivalry has only intensified as these two players begin their second season, escalating to something that is beyond the game of basketball. Just A “Basketball Play” The play that sparked the investigation happened in the third quarter of the game. Clark jumped and reached over Reese’s head for the basketball just as Reese was going up for a wide-open shot. The contact appeared deliberate, causing Reese to fall to the floor and prompting a confrontation between the two players. Officials responded by assessing Clark with a flagrant foul and Reese with a technical foul. While Clark later explained her actions and Reese called it simply “a basketball play,” Reese faced significant criticism from fans, including racially motivated comments. The reaction to this “basketball play” is a prime example of how race plays a major role in how the media and fans interpret players. Clark and Reese are two very competitive and talented players, yet Reese often receives backlash for her “attitude” while Clark is praised for her “competitive edge.” This difference is not just about perceptions. Rather, it impacts how fans treat players and influences how sporting leagues handle misconduct. The biases that have occurred through this “rivalry” are a key example of how fan behavior crosses the line into harassment or abuse, especially targeted attacks like racial slurs. This raises serious questions about the duty of care owed to players and the measures leagues must take to protect them from these occurrences. Legal Protections for Players We often forget that star athletes are employees who have a right to a safe and harassment-free workplace under the law. Just as any profession requires, athletes have the right to perform their jobs without being subjected to abuse, discrimination, or hostile environments. Though their workplace is in arenas with millions watching while most of us are in a more traditional workplace setting, it does not diminish their right to a safe environment. Clark and Angel receiving essentially the opposite treatment reflects how public bias can transition into workplace hazards. This drastic disparity shows why professional leagues must actively monitor the fan behavior of fans to protect players before it becomes out of control. Workplace safety laws, such as those enforced under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, require employers to provide an environment free from harassment. For professional sports leagues and teams, this means taking reasonable steps to prevent and address abusive conduct, including harassment by fans during games. While it is challenging to control every fan in a stadium or arena, leagues are expected to enforce fan conduct policies, remove disruptive individuals, and ensure security measures are in place to protect players. Failure to do so can open the door to legal claims based on negligence or a hostile work environment. The Freedom of Speech Debate One argument that may arise is an individual’s First Amendment right. Fans do have the right to express themselves at games, including cheering, jeering, and showing passion. However, the First Amendment does not protect speech that crosses into harassment, threats, or racial slurs. This is especially true in a private venue like a sports arena, where the owner sets the rules of conduct. Courts have generally upheld that venues can limit disruptive or abusive behavior to maintain a safe environment. Balancing Player Protection and Fan Expressions This balance between protecting players and respecting fan expression is a delicate line to follow. The Reese incident highlights the need for clear policies and swift enforcement to ensure that athletes can perform their tasks without fear of abuse while fans still can be passionate about their teams. This incident involving Reese is a reminder that professional athletes deserve more than just praise and applause. They deserve protection, respect, and a safe environment to perform their job. As leagues like the WNBA continue to grow in visibility and influence, they face increasing pressure to not only celebrate their stars but to also shield them from harm. Finding the line between fan passion and harmful hate is challenging, but it is a responsibility the league cannot ignore. Clear policies, consistent enforcement, and a commitment to creating respect both on and off the court are essential to ensure player safety. How the WNBA responds to this event will set a precedent for the future of sports and send a powerful message about the values we want our leagues to uphold for future generations. Katherine Vescio is a 2L at University of Gonzaga School of Law. She can be found on LinkedIn .

Something great and unique about baseball is that every ballpark is different.   The dimensions of the actual diamond are standard, but after that, teams can pretty much design their home as they see fit. While MLB ballpark guidelines have generally established minimum fence distances, teams can construct a giant wall in left field or include seemingly endless foul territory down the first- or third-base lines.   In addition to varying dimensions, certain ballparks over the course of baseball history have contained quirks and oddities that you’d never see in other sports. We all know about the Green Monster at Fenway Park and ivy walls at Wrigley Field. However, as recently as 2015, Houston’s Minute Maid Park (recently renamed to Daikin Park) featured a slanted hill in center field with a flagpole in the field of play. We also saw many stadiums with bullpen mounds down the foul lines. Some baseball fans and officials consider these to be fun quirks. Others consider them to be hazards.   While MLB clubs have removed hills, flagpoles, and bullpen mounds in recent years for player safety reasons, certain hazards are still in the field of play that contain high risk of injury. Ex-big leaguer Darin Ruf’s collision with an uncovered tarp in Cincinnati is an unfortunate example.   Last week, Ruf filed a lawsuit in the Hamilton County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas against the Cincinnati Reds for damages after he suffered a career-ending injury while crashing into an uncovered tarp roller at Great American Ball Park in 2023. The lawsuit charges the Reds with negligence in failing to maintain safe field conditions and specifically cites the presence of the unpadded metal tarp roller.   Ruf was playing first base for the Brewers when he was injured during the Brewers' 5-4, 11-inning victory over the Reds on June 2, 2023. In the third inning, Ruf was chasing a foul pop when his knee hit the end of the tarp roller.   According to the complaint, Ruf suffered "permanent and substantial deformities to his knee." Ruf went on the 60-day injured list and never played in the major leagues again. Ruf's complaint says the end of the tarp roller was made of sharp metal and had no protective cushioning or cap. "This was an obvious and avoidable risk," Tad Thomas, Ruf's attorney, said in a release announcing the lawsuit. "There are basic safety protocols every MLB team should follow. Leaving an unpadded metal roller on the edge of the field is inexcusable." "This didn't need to happen," Ruf said himself in the statement. "I wish it didn't happen. Players shouldn't have to worry about hidden hazards like that on a major league field." Ruf is seeking punitive and compensatory damages. The complaint says the Reds didn't take reasonable precautions to keep the stadium safe and also are liable for the negligent acts of the grounds crew's "reckless" conduct. To date, the Reds have not provided a statement or update on the matter. Ruf is not the first MLB player to sue after suffering an injury. F ormer MLB outfielder Mac Williamson sued the San Francisco Giants and the owners of Oracle Park  over a concussion he suffered in 2018. The lawsuit claimed his injury, which ended his career, was caused by tripping over a bullpen mound in foul territory and hitting his head on the outfield wall. Williamson alleged that the placement of the bullpen mounds in foul territory created an unreasonable risk of harm. While the outcome of the lawsuit was not publicly disclosed, the Giants did remove the bullpens in foul territory to beyond the outfield fences in 2020.   Outside the baseball context, longtime NFL running Reggie Bush won a lawsuit against the St. Louis Rams for $12.5 million  in 2018 after suffering a knee injury in a game after slipping on a concrete surface when he was pushed out of bounds.    It will be interesting to see what comes of this suit both on the micro and macro level. While it’s likely this individual case settles behind closed doors, nearly every MLB stadium without a roof features a rolled-up tarp along the foul lines. Ruf’s lawsuit may bring about proper protocols and regulations that mandate that these tarps are sufficiently padded and always covered to reduce injury risk for players. MLB and the MLBPA have a common interest in ensuring player safety, so I’m sure this lawsuit will spark discussions between the league and grounds crews across the league to help prevent injuries (and lawsuits) in the future.     Brendan Bell is a Rising 3L at SMU Dedman School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @_bbell5

With next summer’s 2025 FIFA Club World Cup set to kick off in the United States, the tournament is already drawing more than just commercial buzz and global intrigue—it’s setting off alarm bells among national team managers and players alike, who are concerned with one thing: burnout.   The tournament’s expansion to 32 clubs, its month-long format, and a promised prize pool reportedly exceeding $150 million have elevated the Club World Cup’s significance for FIFA and the participating teams. But the timing—just one year ahead of the 2026 World Cup—has ignited a fresh round of conflict between club demands and national team ambitions.   And for many of the game’s biggest stars, the tug-of-war is starting now.   Pulisic and Dest: Fatigue Over Flags One of the most telling early signs came when U.S. Men’s National Team head coach Mauricio Pochettino unveiled his Gold Cup roster— without Christian Pulisic. The AC Milan winger, widely seen as the de facto face of American soccer, was left off the squad due to what’s been labeled as "fatigue" following a demanding club season in Italy. He isn’t alone. Defender Sergiño Dest was also recently dropped from contention, with U.S. Soccer citing his recovery from a long-term ACL injury suffered in April.   Though Pulisic has long been a devoted U.S. international, his absence in a tournament where the U.S. is expected to contend raises eyebrows—especially when contrasted with what’s happening in Europe. It’s not just the fans who’ve taken note.   Pochettino’s Subtle Swipe? Pulisic’s USMNT coach, Mauricio Pochettino, has not exactly hidden his feelings about the decision. When asked about national team participation more broadly, the Argentine offered a pointed reminder of the dedication he’s seen from some of the biggest names in football: “Messi, Mbappé, Neymar . . . they are desperate to play for their national teams,” he said. He then added, “[t]he people need to prioritize the national team.”   Was it a direct jab at Pulisic’s decision? The inference was clear enough for some to read between the lines. The pressure from managers like Pochettino shows how players must constantly walk a tightrope of unspoken expectations, particularly when the stakes—both financial and reputational—are as high as they will be at the Club World Cup.   Tuchel Sets a Hard Line for England Meanwhile, over in England, national team manager Thomas Tuchel has made headlines for his own uncompromising stance .   Despite the Club World Cup looming, Tuchel recently named a full-strength 26-man England squad for upcoming matches against Andorra and Senegal. His selection includes players from Chelsea (Cole Palmer, Levi Colwill, Reece James, Trevoh Chalobah, and Noni Madueke), Bayern Munich’s Harry Kane, Atlético Madrid’s Conor Gallagher, and Real Madrid’s Jude Bellingham—all of whom are expected to feature in the Club World Cup.   Tuchel made it clear that no player would be allowed to leave the national team early to prepare for the tournament, emphasizing that country comes first. Perhaps to underscore his point, he left out Manchester City star Phil Foden altogether (at Foden’s own request)—giving the player the chance to partake in the Club World Cup despite City manager Pep Guardiola admitting Foden was "tired" and in need of rest.   It’s a bold move, especially considering the competition for England spots and the prestige of players like Foden. But it sends a clear message: Tuchel wants total commitment to the national team, even if it means butting heads with club managers—or benching superstars.   Redemption and Recalibration: The Ivan Toney Case Perhaps even more surprising than Foden’s exclusion was the inclusion of Ivan Toney. After an eight-month ban by the FA for betting violations and a subsequent move to Saudi Arabia, most assumed Toney's England career was finished. But after finishing second behind Cristiano Ronaldo in the Saudi Pro League goal-scoring charts, Tuchel rewarded Toney’s resurgence with a national team recall.   For a manager so concerned with discipline and national pride, the decision to reintegrate Toney—who many viewed as persona non grata—signals that performance and hunger may ultimately trump baggage. But it also adds a layer of complexity: while some fatigued players are being discarded and pushed aside, others are being flown across continents for a second chance.   A Double Standard? Mbappé, Bellingham, and the Uneven Playing Field In the midst of all of this, one can’t help but notice that not all players are held to the same standards. Kylian Mbappé played in the UEFA Nations League this summer and will almost certainly make the trip to the U.S. next year for PSG’s Club World Cup campaign. Jude Bellingham, fresh off a grueling debut season with Real Madrid (and reportedly set for shoulder surgery following the conclusion of the tournament), is also expected to juggle both club and country.   This inconsistency—where some players are given time to rest while others shoulder massive workloads—only intensifies the debate over what is expected of modern footballers. Are stars like Bellingham and Mbappé simply better equipped to handle the load? Or are national team managers simply more willing to bend the rules when it comes to their most marketable players?   The Bigger Picture: Club Power, Contracts, and the 2026 World Cup Horizon The Club World Cup is more than just a tournament—it's a proving ground for FIFA’s ambition to turn club competitions into global blockbusters. But with the 2026 World Cup on the horizon, national team coaches are already strategizing, monitoring player workloads, and building continuity. The message is growing clearer: skip the Club World Cup if necessary, rest up, and focus on the badge.   Yet, there's one massive problem: contracts. The majority of players may be contractually obligated to appear for their club in tournaments like the Club World Cup if they are healthy and selected. And with millions of dollars in prize money at stake—not to mention branding opportunities in the U.S. market—clubs will likely demand that their biggest and best stars show up.   That raises serious questions and poses tough dilemmas: What happens when a club insists a player travel and compete, even if the player—or their national team manager—wants them to rest? What leverage do national federations have? Could we see situations where clubs “bench” players who opt out? Or worse, will players risk injury or long-term wear just to keep everyone happy?   A Balancing Act with No Easy Answer As the borders between club and country blur—and as the calendar becomes increasingly congested—the burden being placed on elite players is more visible than ever. Christian Pulisic’s absence may be the first domino to fall, but it's unlikely to be the last.   If this summer is any indication, the lead-up to the 2025 Club World Cup (and 2026 World Cup) will be defined by tough decisions, political posturing, and a whole lot of pressure on players caught in the middle.   Because in the end, no matter what badge is on their chest—club or country—it’s the players who carry the weight.   Oliver Canning is a 3L at the University of Miami School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @OCanning and found on LinkedIn .

Have you ever wondered what MLB would look like with a salary cap? As a lifelong Yankees fan already aware of this issue, I've seen teams like the Dodgers and Mets recently outspend everyone, making me think about this even more than I would like. Unlike the NFL, NBA, and NHL, MLB doesn't have a salary cap. Instead, it uses a luxury tax system that penalizes teams exceeding a set payroll threshold, with the tax rate increasing for consecutive years over the limit. This has led to massive spending gaps, with the Dodgers ($337M), Mets ($324M), and Yankees ($289M) at the top, while teams like the White Sox ($67M), Marlins ($68M), and Athletics ($74M) are at the bottom in 2025 payrolls. The difference between the second and third highest payrolls (Mets and Yankees) alone is $35 million. Many fans worry about the future of the sport if this continues. A salary cap would prevent high-spending teams from dominating and encourage lower-spending teams to invest more in their rosters, fostering greater league parity. For this speculative exercise, I've set a hypothetical MLB salary cap at $200 million and a floor at 90% ($180 million), considering MLB's 2024 revenue of $12.1 billion and a 26-player roster size. Here's how current 2025 payrolls would stack up against this hypothetical cap: Team 2025 Payroll Cap Floor (180M) Ceiling (200M) Los Angeles Dodgers $337,000,000.00 -$137,000,000 New York Mets $324,000,000.00 -$124,000,000 New York Yankees $289,000,000.00 -$89,000,000 Philadelphia Phillies $279,000,000.00 -$79,000,000 Toronto Blue Jays $247,000,000.00 -$47,000,000 Houston Astros $219,000,000.00 -$19,000,000 Texas Rangers $217,000,000.00 -$17,000,000 Atlanta Braves $214,000,000.00 -$14,000,000 San Diego Padres $210,000,000.00 -$10,000,000 Boston Red Sox $199,000,000.00 Chicago Cubs $193,000,000.00 Los Angeles Angels $193,000,000.00 Arizona Diamondbacks $181,000,000.00 San Francisco Giants $170,000,000.00 $10,000,000.00 Baltimore Orioles $161,000,000.00 $19,000,000.00 Seattle Mariners $152,000,000.00 $28,000,000.00 Minnesota Twins $146,000,000.00 $34,000,000.00 Detroit Tigers $143,000,000.00 $37,000,000.00 St. Louis Cardinals $135,000,000.00 $45,000,000.00 Colorado Rockies $125,000,000.00 $55,000,000.00 Kansas City Royals $119,000,000.00 $61,000,000.00 Washington Nationals $114,000,000.00 $66,000,000.00 Cincinnati Reds $113,000,000.00 $67,000,000.00 Milwaukee Brewers $108,000,000.00 $72,000,000.00 Cleveland Guardians $100,000,000.00 $80,000,000.00 Pittsburgh Pirates $90,000,000.00 $90,000,000.00 Tampa Bay Rays $90,000,000.00 $90,000,000.00 Athletics $74,000,000.00 $106,000,000.00 Miami Marlins $68,000,000.00 $112,000,000.00 Chicago White Sox $67,000,000.00 $113,000,000.00   Only four teams—the Red Sox, Cubs, Angels, and Diamondbacks—fall within this proposed cap. While the Red Sox are underperforming, the D'Backs and Cubs are competitive playoff teams. Surprisingly, 17 teams are currently under the proposed cap floor, indicating a significant amount of underspending across the league. For instance, the Chicago White Sox would need to nearly triple their payroll to reach the cap floor. Conversely, the Dodgers and Mets would need to cut their payroll by almost 25% to get to the ceiling. Here’s how the top five teams over the cap might adjust: Dodgers : They'd need to cut $137 million, likely meaning players like Mookie Betts or Freddie Freeman would be gone. Additions like Teoscar Hernandez, Blake Snell, and Michael Conforto likely wouldn't happen, and Max Muncy and Tanner Scott could be cut. Mets : Juan Soto's $61 million salary wouldn't be an option. They'd probably need to part with Starling Marte, Edwin Diaz, and Jeff McNeil, or choose between Pete Alonso and Francisco Lindor. Yankees : Currently just under $300 million, they wouldn't sign Max Fried or trade for Cody Bellinger without shedding Carlos Rodon or DJ LeMahieu. Phillies : This would be a nightmare for Dave Dombrowski, forcing prospects like Andrew Painter, Aidan Miller, and Justin Crawford into earlier roles to replace key players like Trea Turner, Nick Castellanos, or even Bryce Harper. Blue Jays : Vlad Guerrero Jr. likely wouldn't receive a large extension. While Anthony Santander might stay, the team would have to lose George Springer, Kevin Gausman, or Chris Bassitt. A salary cap would drastically alter team compositions and the league's landscape, making more valuable players available to smaller market teams and fostering greater competition as underspending teams would need to offer contracts to attract new free agents. Michael Moore is a graduate of New York Law School and former member of the school’s Sports Law Society. When he’s not working at the New York Law Department he’s thinking about the intersection of sports and law and when the Knicks or Rangers will finally win a championship.

Malik Beasley just had one of his best seasons statistically  of his career with the Detroit Pistons in the 2024-25 NBA season, averaging 16.3 points, 1.7 assists, 2.6 rebounds, and shot a career-high 41.6% from three-point land. Beasley played a major role in helping the Pistons end a six-year playoff drought, helping the Pistons reach the NBA playoffs this season, and Beasley was a finalist for the NBA’s Sixth Man of the Year Award this season. But now Beasley has run into some potential legal trouble as he finds himself being sued by his former agency, Hazan Sports Management (HSM). Specifically, HSM, now Beasley’s former agency is suing Beasley for breach of contract and related claims, where they allege  Beasley owes at least $1 million in damages. HSM claims that when Beasley became a client on November 27, 2023, by signing him to a standard player agent contract (SPAC), they also paid Beasley $650,000 in advance as part of a separate player marketing agreement which granted HSM exclusive marketing rights that would be for a term of four years. HSM alleges after helping Beasley resuscitate his career by securing him a one-year, $6 million contract with the Detroit Pistons, Beasley fired HSM as his on-court representation earlier this year in February and breached the exclusivity provisions of the marketing agreement when he hired Brian Jungreis of Seros Partners to serve as his on-court agent and marketing representative just 15 months into the four-year agreement as HSM alleges. HSM states that when they took Beasley on as a client, he was a player with “known issues,” issues that included financial ones. The substantial marketing advance of $650,000 to Beasley as the agency claims was to in part help those financial issues of Beasley and to become his exclusive marketing agent as HSM expected Beasley would turn around his career where Beasley’s marketing rights would become valuable and generate high commissions for HSM. The player marketing agreement included a liquidated damages clause that requires Beasley to pay HSM $1 million in the event that the agreement is terminated for any reason prior to the end of the four-year term. The liquidated damages clause of $1 million is one of the claims HSM is seeking judgment on against Beasley. It remains to be seen whether this liquidated damages clause in this matter between Beasley and HSM will be enforceable under New York law. If the case does move forward, an anticipated defense that Beasley can bring forward is that the liquidated damages clause in this contract with HSM is not fair and reasonable, therefore being an unenforceable penalty clause as New York law requires  liquidated damages clauses to bear a reasonable relation to anticipated or actual damages in order to not be a contract provision for an unreasonably large liquidated damage amount which is void as a penalty. To counter this, as HSM has already stated this in the complaint, is that both parties agreed and accepted that this liquidated damages provision in the amount of $1 million in the event of a breach was “fair and acceptable in the light of the amount of the Marketing Advance and the risk assumed by Marketing Agent with respect to the Marketing Advance.” The player marketing contract states that “any and all disputes” arising out of it “shall be adjudicated” by a New York court. This is important because this leads the dispute of the marketing agreement to litigation instead of arbitration which is a standard clause in all SPAC’s where the arbitration clause covers disputes between a player and their agents concerning their contractual relationship. Notably, HSM is not alleging that Beasley breached his SPAC with the agency, but rather tying the breach claim to the marketing contract, so in this instance Beasley would not be able to have the complaint dismissed through claiming that it must first be heard by an arbitrator. This case highlights and shows the importance of enforceability of such agreements, and the factors that can lead to one being successful in dismissing such a suit or being successful in recovering damages from the other side. It also shows what can entice players to sign such player-agent contracts, such as marketing guarantees, cash advances, and other inducements. As of now Beasley has not responded to this suit brought against him by HSM and no lawyer has appeared on his behalf on this matter. Romen Richardson is a rising 3L at Howard University School of Law in Washington, DC. He aspires to be a prominent sports & entertainment attorney after graduating law school, and also hopes to one day be an NBA Agent. You can follow him here on LinkedIn .

The NCAA’s transfer portal was created to give student-athletes greater autonomy, the freedom to explore new opportunities and make decisions that align with their academic and athletic goals. For high school prospects, the recruiting process similarly aimed to empower athletes to choose the best path for their future. Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) reforms were intended to complement this freedom, finally allowing athletes to be compensated for the value they bring to their schools and communities. However, what began as a framework for empowerment and fair compensation has quickly morphed into something far more complicated: a quasi-pay-for-play system where inducements masquerade as endorsements and recruiting has escalated into an arms race funded by third-party NIL collectives. The Rise of NIL Collectives: A Legal Gray Zone These third-party NIL collectives are donor-funded groups that pool money to support athletes at specific schools. [1] These collectives have become powerful players in the transfer process. Functioning as intermediaries between schools and athletes, many collectives now offer upfront guarantees of NIL compensation as a condition of transferring or enrolling, echoing the salary negotiations of professional sports. This raises a critical question: if NIL deals are structured to induce athletes to enroll or transfer to specific schools, are we witnessing a covert violation of amateurism or its outright collapse? Case Study: Jaden Rashada and the NIL Fallout No case better illustrates this murky legal area than that of Jaden Rashada, a highly touted high school quarterback. In late 2022, Rashada reportedly signed an NIL deal with a Florida-based collective valued at $13.85 million, contingent upon his enrollment at the University of Florida. [2] When the collective failed to deliver on its financial promises, the deal unraveled. Rashada decommitted from Florida and ultimately enrolled at Arizona State. [3] The fallout from this agreement exposed the transactional nature of many NIL deals and the risks inherent in unregulated, donor-driven collectives. While no NCAA violations were officially alleged, the saga sparked widespread debate over whether NIL has turned recruiting into open bidding wars, challenging the NCAA’s guidelines. Rashada’s experience highlights the fragile position of young athletes promised life-changing sums, only to find themselves entangled in contractual disputes and legal ambiguity before ever stepping foot on the field. The NCAA’s Enforcement Challenges The NCAA maintains that NIL compensation must not be used as a recruiting inducement or tied directly to athletic performance. [4] Under NCAA guidelines, NIL agreements must be for legitimate services, such as endorsements, social media promotions, or public appearances. [5] Compensation cannot be contingent on committing to a specific school, nor can schools or collectives directly guarantee NIL deals for recruits or transfers. [6] Yet, in practice, these rules have proven nearly impossible to enforce. Universities enjoy plausible deniability, as collectives operate independently on paper, even while advancing the schools' interests. High school prospects and transfer portal athletes are swiftly contacted by collectives tied formally or informally to prospective programs. These collectives often offer six- or seven-figure deals, contingent on enrollment or transfer decisions. As a result, while schools claim separation from the process, collectives continue to exploit the gap between NCAA policy and practical reality. Legal Exposure and Future Litigation Risks As the NIL marketplace grows, the blurred line between permissible activity and impermissible inducements is drawing increased legal and regulatory scrutiny. While the NCAA has stepped up enforcement, courts have frequently ruled against restrictions on athlete compensation, citing antitrust concerns, most notably in  NCAA v. Alston , [7]  where the Supreme Court unanimously found the NCAA’s limits on education-related benefits to be unlawful. More litigation is inevitable. Some state legislatures have passed laws allowing schools to play a more active role in NIL deals, directly conflicting with NCAA regulations. [8] Federal intervention also looms, with multiple proposed bills aiming to establish a national standard for NIL governance. For universities, collectives, and athletes alike, the legal landscape remains unsettled. Without clearer guardrails, whether through NCAA reform, state law harmonization, or federal regulation, the quasi-professional model of college sports will continue to evolve in unpredictable ways. The Future of Amateurism The convergence of the transfer portal, NIL opportunities, and the growing influence of collectives has transformed recruiting and transfers into a full-blown competitive marketplace. What started as an effort to enhance athlete autonomy has inadvertently accelerated the erosion of amateurism and upended the collegiate sports model. Unless the NCAA and lawmakers can reconcile athlete compensation with the preservation of competitive integrity, the line between college and professional sports will continue to blur, perhaps irreversibly. Sade Frazier is an attorney and Sports Lawyers Association NextGen Committee member, passionate about how NIL, IP, tech, and media are shaping the future of sports law. Learn more at www.linkedin.com/in/sadefrazier .   Sources: [1]  Pete Nakos, What are NIL Collectives and How Do They Operate? , On3 (July 6, 2022), https://www.on3.com/nil/news/what-are-nil-collectives-and-how-do-they-operate/ . [2]  Thomas Hunt & Kyle Stroup, A $13.85 Million NIL Deal Gone Wrong: Jaden Rashada Sues University of Florida , JD Supra (June 26, 2024), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-13-85-million-nil-deal-gone-wrong-4508505/#:~:text=The%20Recruitment%20and%20NIL%20Agreement,remaining%20$13.35%20million%20to%20follow . [3]   Id . [4]  Twane Duckworth and Mike Williams, Understanding NIL Rights for College Athletes , WTW (Dec. 20, 2024), https://www.wtwco.com/en-us/insights/2024/12/understanding-nil-rights-for-college-athletes . [5]   Id. [6]   Id. [7]  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 1 (2021). [8]   NIL College Rules , On3, https://www.on3.com/nil/laws/college/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2025).

New York basketball is starting May off strong, and I'm not talking about the Knicks leading the Celtics 3-1. Knicks and Rangers fans, get excited to welcome a new tea partner to MSG. Though really it is the Liberty who are stealing the show, signing multiple partnership agreements in advance of their home opener this Saturday, May 17th. New York Liberty and Liberty Mutual sign jersey deal. Liberty Mutual's logo will be featured on the jerseys below the players' names. Yahoo Sports New York Liberty and Rihanna's Fenty brand sign partnership. As part of the deal, the Liberty's pre-game warm-up jackets and shooting shirts will feature the Fenty logo. Vogue Business MSG names Snapple its Official Tea Partner. Snapple to be the Official Tea Partner of the Knicks, Rangers and MSG. Snapple will be featured on digital signage throughout MSG on game days. Snapple will also host sampling opportunities, and a "Statue of Liber-Tea" photo opportunity. MSG Kirsten Flicker is a graduate of Fordham University School of Law from the class of 2021. She can be found on LinkedIn here .

In the midst of the college football Name, Image, and Likeness (“NIL”) era, nothing says “we need some guardrails” quite like the Iamaleava debacle. Within the past week, both Nico Iamaleava (“Nico”), Tennessee’s starting quarterback, and his brother, Arkansas early enrollee Madden Iamaleava have both hit the transfer portal – despite being in superficially strong positions – leaving college football fans across the country scratching their heads. With the NCAA v. House settlement on hold, Trump administration’s rescission of Title IX guidance for NIL, and state of college football at a critical juncture, the straightforward question remains, though the answer is anything but simple: what comes next?   Nico, the former starting quarterback for the university of Tennessee has sent college football into a frenzy with his latest moves and rumored demands for exorbitant sums of money. For context, Nico’s contract with Tennessee of roughly $8 million over three years made him one of the highest-paid players in college football. Despite zero threat of losing his starting job at the SEC powerhouse, he recently sought to restructure his deal to the tune of around $4 million per year. While he was a highly touted signal caller out of high school and certainly displayed some flashes his freshman year, many would argue Nico did not warrant a higher salary. After failed negotiations with Tennessee and his absence at multiple practices, he and the team decided to part ways. Nico recently committed to UCLA, and ironically, he’ll be earning less per year at a school with a football program miles behind the University of Tennessee in terms of prominence, success, and development. Funny enough, UCLA quarterback Joey Aguilar entered the portal and committed to Tennessee in the wake of Nico’s decision, effectively marking what could be considered the first ever college football trade. While Nico’s father denied that money was the core issue, numerous reports and indications suggest this was likely a strategy to secure a higher payout.   Just when you thought Nico entering the portal was wild, the plot has thickened as his younger brother recently decided to join him by entering the portal and heading to UCLA. Nico’s younger brother, Madden Iamaleava (“Madden”), was a four star recruit in the class of 2025 poised to compete for the starting job at Arkansas. Although Madden was initially committed to UCLA, the time of the decision raises some questions. While it’s true both Iamaleava’s are from Southern California, why would they suddenly leave big SEC programs with bright futures to return home together at the same school? What prompted the change? Let’s not sugarcoat it – money’s likely at play, and college football fans aren’t exactly thrilled.   The Iamaleava debacle is making headlines, but more importantly, it’s reinforcing growing concerns about NIL in college sports. So much so that the University of Arkansas’ NIL collective, Arkansas Edge, is reportedly demanding around $200,000 from Madden, who entered the portal just after spring camp. This represents close to half of Madden’s alleged $500,000 contract, signed in December. Amidst calls for buyouts in college football athlete contracts, it would come as a surprise that many NIL contracts already have buyout clauses, though few have been enforced until now. So why the reluctance to enforce such provisions? For one, suing 18-19 year-olds does not reflect well on any school. However, the recent surge in contract breaches suggests this enforcement of such provisions might become commonplace. Given reports that Nico was under a three-year deal, he could potentially be the next subject of legal action especially in light of how he left Knoxville.   So, what is the answer? It’s no secret that the majority of college football fans are deeply frustrated with the current state of the sport, and there’s little appetite to see a perpetual free agency in college sports. Over the past year – and specifically in recent weeks – many now believe the only viable solution is granting college athletes employee status and implementing collective bargaining to ensure loyalty to schools. In NCAA v. Johnson, the Third Circuit allowed the athletes’ claims to proceed, as opposed to dismissing them outright. If successful, the athletes could reshape the landscape of college athletics. With athletes under employment status, schools would not hesitate to strictly enforce buyout provisions. Moreover, the House v. NCAA offers a glimmer of hope and change. The proposed settlement includes $2.8 billion in back pay for current and former athletes, reduced roster sizes, and a new revenue-sharing model that allows schools to directly pay student-athletes. Considering the National Labor Relations Board generally governs unionization and collective bargaining, it appears employment status would be necessary for such changes to be made. However, there are plenty of critics to that approach, with many believing the NCAA should take the lead in implementing reforms on its own. Unfortunately, the NCAA might have missed the boat for leading on this issue, as implementing such changes could likely expose the organization to antitrust liability.   The final twist comes with the influence of the Trump administration and Republican control across all branches of government. Before former President Joe Biden left office, his administration issued in January of 2025, guidance stating that NIL compensation, even from third parties, should be distributed in a nondiscriminatory manner based on Title IX. Considering the Trump Administration has been less supportive of extensive regulation regarding NIL, it comes as no surprise that his administration rescinded the Title IX guidance issued from Biden.   The future of college football remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: it’s a full-blown disaster. Given the passion, camaraderie, and unity that comes with the sport, a solution must be hammered out soon, or we’ll keep seeing situations like the Iamaleava brothers popping up left and right - college football and college sports as a whole, deserve better.

I.         Background Although Nico Iamaleava dominated headlines in the past month before transferring to UCLA, it is his younger brother, Madden Iamaleava, who has found himself in the middle of controversy as of late. A four-star quarterback recruit, Madden Iamaleava initially committed to UCLA but flipped his commitment to the University of Arkansas on December 4, 2024. [i] He enrolled in January 2025 but announced his intention to transfer back to UCLA just four months and zero snaps of competitive football later, following his brother Nico Iamaleava’s lead. [ii] This decision raised concerns among the University of Arkansas and its NIL collective, Arkansas Edge, particularly since Madden had not participated in any athletic competition and had reportedly received up to $500,000 in NIL-related compensation. [iii]   In response to Iamaleava’s decision to transfer, Athletic Director Hunter Yurachek issued a public statement supporting Arkansas Edge’s efforts to enforce repayment provisions embedded in NIL agreements. [iv] This support reflects a growing concern within collegiate athletics regarding the accountability of student-athletes receiving NIL funds without fulfilling corresponding obligations.     II.         Breach of Contract Framework Under Arkansas Law Under Arkansas law, each of the following four elements are necessary to sustain a breach of contract claim: (1) The existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) The obligation of the defendant under that contract; (3) A violation of the contract terms by the defendant; and (4) Resulting damages suffered by the plaintiff. [v] Each of these elements must be supported by credible evidence and fact-specific analysis.   III.         Application of Arkansas Contract Law to the Madden Iamaleava Case o   Existence of an Enforceable Contract: Reports indicate that Madden Iamaleava signed a one-year NIL agreement with Arkansas Edge. This agreement included a buyout clause stipulating that if the athlete breached the agreement, such as by transferring before the contract's term expired, he would be responsible for repaying 50% of the contract’s remaining value. [vi] o   Obligations and Breach: While it cannot be confirmed without a review of the signed contract, the Arkansas Edge agreement likely required Madden to perform promotional, social media, or appearance-related events in exchange for financial compensation. His transfer prior to the fulfillment of these obligations could constitute a material breach. The issue of whether he provided any of these obligations before departure would be fact-specific and critical to determining liability. o   Damages: Damages in contract law are intended to compensate the injured party for the loss. In this case, Arkansas Edge would need to demonstrate that they suffered quantifiable economic harm. This could include the loss of promotional opportunities, brand value, or reputational benefits anticipated from Madden’s participation.  IV.         Challenges in Proving Damages: o   Uncertainty Around Value : One of the most significant hurdles is the speculative nature of anticipated NIL benefits. As the opportunity for Iamaleava to perform had not yet occurred, the collective is left to argue about the hypothetical value of branding exposure, promotional opportunities, or reputational gains that might have happened. Courts are generally reluctant to award damages based on conjecture, and without clear, objective indicators of value, claims risk being dismissed as too uncertain. o   Lack of Performance Data : Since Iamaleava did not play and it is unclear if he performed NIL obligations, there are no engagement numbers, media impressions, or fan interactions that could help estimate what the NIL efforts might have been worth. Without those metrics, any estimate becomes highly uncertain. o   Comparability Issues : Valuing NIL deals often involves comparing the agreement to similar arrangements in the market. However, there may be very few comparable deals involving athletes with similar profiles or market value. Even where other NIL deals exist, differences in athlete profile, brand reach, and contract terms can undermine their usefulness as comparisons. o   Causation : The collective must prove that the loss resulted directly from the breach and not from other intervening events.    V.         Statutory Support The Arkansas Publicity Rights Act, as significantly amended by Act 589 (Ark. 2023), provides a legal framework for enforcing NIL contracts. This law confirms that student-athletes in Arkansas have the right to be paid for the use of their name, image, and likeness and it also expands the tools available to universities and related organizations to respond when those agreements are violated.  It states: "A university may bring a cause of action against any individual or entity who induces a student-athlete to breach an NIL contract when that athlete has already signed an enrollment agreement with the university." [vii]  VI.         Application by Arkansas NIL Collectives The revised law extends legal standing not only to universities, but also to their "supporting foundations or authorized entities." This means groups like Arkansas Edge, which describes itself as working to support University of Arkansas athletes and using the university's brand and connections, may potentially be treated as an "authorized entity" with the right to sue in court. [viii] , [ix] This language is especially important because it may allow Arkansas Edge to directly file a lawsuit without having to go through the university. If another school’s boosters or NIL collective offered money to entice Madden Iamaleava to transfer and terminate his deal, Arkansas Edge may be able to argue that this was a clear violation of the law and sue for damages. The statute also strengthens enforcement by allowing recovery not just for actual financial losses but also for punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs. This creates a strong deterrent against any tampering. [x] Simply put, the law also prohibits anyone from promising NIL money to a player already committed to an Arkansas school as a way to get them to switch schools. That provision is relevant in the Iamaleava case, if any NIL transfer conversations happened while he was under contract with Arkansas. [xi] This statutory update shows Arkansas’s proactive stance in attempting to regulate the constantly evolving NIL environment. It offers universities and their partners clear legal pathways if they are harmed by unethical or unlawful acts. The law provides collectives such as Arkansas Edge with safeguards against unauthorized recruitment efforts and establishes a way to recover compensation if a student-athlete breaches their NIL agreement. VII.         NIL Buyout Clauses Buyout clauses are becoming more common in NIL deals, especially with high-profile recruits. These clauses are designed to protect collectives by allowing them to recover some money if an athlete leaves before the contract ends. Still, whether these clauses can be enforced in court depends on the specific facts of each case. Courts usually look at whether the buyout is a fair estimate of potential losses or just a way to punish the athlete. For a buyout clause to hold up legally, it must: o   Represent a reasonable estimate of anticipated loss at the time the contract was formed; o   Not be punitive in nature; and o   Be clearly written in the contract. Attorney Darren Heitner explains that buyouts characterized as penalties are less likely to be upheld in court. However, if they are a fair estimation of harm from lost NIL activities, they may be valid. [xii] Mit Winter adds that collectives must demonstrate how the loss of an athlete’s NIL value translates into measurable economic harm and that without this demonstration, courts may deem the buyout clause unenforceable [xiii] . VIII.         Challenges of NIL Enforcement Even if Arkansas Edge possesses a solid legal foundation to pursue breach of contract or statutory claims, broader practical and reputational concerns must be weighed carefully before initiating formal legal action. The NIL environment is not only governed by law but also shaped by public perception. o   Reputation Risk: Bringing a lawsuit against a young student-athlete, especially one who may be perceived as making a personal or family-driven choice, can be viewed negatively by the public and also potential recruits. The narrative of a powerful collective suing an 18-year-old could be damaging to the University of Arkansas’s broader athletic brand. Such action may also give the impression that Arkansas is inflexible or hostile to athlete mobility, potentially deterring future prospects from engaging with the program. o   Enforceability: Collecting on a judgment can be difficult. Even if a court rules in favor of Arkansas Edge, collecting on a judgment may pose significant challenges especially if they have not yet achieved any commercial success. A favorable ruling without meaningful enforcement may have limited practical impact. o   Negotiation Leverage: Often, demand letters serve to open negotiations rather than enforce payment in full. A settlement may offer faster resolution, reduced reputational damage to the Collective, and limit reputational damage in the court of public opinion. o   Policy Trends: As states move toward legislation allowing schools to pay athletes directly, contract structures and enforcement mechanisms may evolve further. Incentive-based compensation plans may reduce the risks associated with upfront lump-sum payments.  IX.         Conclusion Arkansas Edge likely has a legitimate argument that Madden Iamaleava breached his NIL contract by transferring to another university before fulfilling the terms of the agreement. The existence of a buyout clause, combined with support from Arkansas contract law and specific provisions under Act 589, gives the collective a potentially strong legal position. However, whether Arkansas Edge can successfully enforce the contract depends on more than just having the law on its side. The outcome will largely rest on the specific language used in the agreement and whether the collective can clearly show how it was financially harmed by Iamaleava’s early departure. Proving such losses in court may be difficult, especially if they are measured by intangibles like publicity or fan engagement. This situation highlights a major issue in the NIL landscape. How do we balance the rights of student-athletes to make personal and career decisions with the expectations of universities and NIL collectives that invest significant resources in these athletes. As NIL agreements become more commonplace and more complex, clearer legal standards, contract language, and policies will be essential. Both athletes and collectives deserve a system that is fair. A stable NIL environment will depend not only on strong contracts and clear NCAA standards, but also on mutual understanding and respect between institutions and student-athletes [i] Madden Iamaleava (@MaddenIamaleava), X (Apr. 21, 2025, 6:55 PM), https://x.com/MaddenIamaleava/status/1864417254101930392 . [ii] On3 Sports (@On3sports), X (Apr. 17, 2025, 3:10 PM), https://x.com/On3sports/status/1914473758292639946 . [iii] Yurachek, Arkansas Edge Make Bold Statement , Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Apr. 24, 2025), https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2025/apr/24/yurachek-arkansas-edge-make-bold-statement/ . [iv] Pete Nakos, Arkansas AD Hunter Yurachek Enforcing NIL Buyouts for Madden Iamaleava , On3 (Apr. 24, 2025), https://www.on3.com/nil/news/arkansas-athletic-director-hunter-yurachek-enforcing-nil-buyouts-madden-iamaleava/ . [v] Smith v. Eisen , 245 S.W.3d 160, 168–69 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) [vi] Amanda Christovich, Will Arkansas Spur an NIL Buyout Crackdown? , Front Office Sports (Apr. 24, 2025), https://frontofficesports.com/will-arkansas-spur-an-nil-buyout-crackdown/ . [vii] (Act 589, § 4-75-1308(b)) [viii] (§ 4-75-1308(b)(2), Act 589). [ix] What We Do , Arkansas Edge NIL, https://arkansasedgenil.com/pages/what-we-do . [x] (§ 4-75-1308(c), Act 589). [xi] (§ 4-75-1308(b)(1), Act 589). [xii] Amanda Christovich, Will Arkansas Spur an NIL Buyout Crackdown? , Front Office Sports (Apr. 24, 2025), https://frontofficesports.com/will-arkansas-spur-an-nil-buyout-crackdown/ . [xiii] Amanda Christovich, Will Arkansas Spur an NIL Buyout Crackdown? , Front Office Sports (Apr. 24, 2025), https://frontofficesports.com/will-arkansas-spur-an-nil-buyout-crackdown/ .

The National Football League is one of the most powerful organizations in the sports realm, and yet, there has been limited progress made in the promotion of mental health. There have been many tragic stories that have been a result of a lack of mental health services, and there is clearly something that needs to be done.   With an increased focus on mental health in former professional football players, there comes a need for increased legislation in the area. Medical studies have shown that having a playing professional football is generally associated with increased mental health problems, with an additional risk to those who have suffered concussions at some point in their career. In a study of 2500 former NFL players, depression rates were as high as 11.1%.1 For the sake of comparison, the nationwide rate of depression in men 20-39 is 5.5%, dipping to 5.2% in men 40-59, and sharply rising to 6.1% for men above 60.1 This, along with the fact that both men and football players have a low rate of reporting mental health problems, creates a dangerous circumstance in which there is a lack of, and a clear need for, legislation regulating mental health in football.1   Given these startling statistics, the National Football League has not drastically updated their mental health promotion programs since 2019, with the release of the Behavior Health Agreement.2 Given that these mental health statistics are from 2020, there is still more work to be done. Football is an inherently violent sport, and therefore the players should be afforded the most protection possible, to both their physical and mental health.   Additionally, former NFL players are not awarded lifetime health insurance. In terms of neurological care, this is cared for by the NFL Player Care Foundation.3 However, players are responsible for most of the assessments, care, and travel unless they fit the requirements of a “vested player.” This only applies to players who have played at least three NFL games in three seasons.4 This needs to be expanded, as it only takes one game for a player to suffer a concussion and therefore have an expanded range of potential mental health problems. This is a major issue, given that mental health problems can lead to lifelong difficulties, and yet there is only a subsection of the former population of players that are able to benefit by the long-term healthcare plans of the league. The NFL is one of the highest-profile businesses in the nation. Though it is still just that, a business, the long-term mental health of current and former players still needs to come first. The need for expanded healthcare plans for former players has never been greater, even with greater resources and science that has recently been developed in order to enhance player safety. The recent medical developments and enhancements to increase mental health awareness mean nothing for former players already impacted by the violent sport if there is nothing done to expand coverage. The statistics don’t lie and given that there is such a concern for mental health nowadays, there needs to be expanded action that matches that concern.   There’s no easy solution to this problem, as it would be costly, and an agreement would need to be made between both the NFL and the NFLPA. Though there was the agreement that was made in 2020, it still didn’t do nearly enough to improve help for former players.5 This agreement kept in place the subset of players that get healthcare benefits, and even though it was expanded to players with three credited NFL seasons, as noted before, it still does not cover all former NFL players, which is the goal for the future. Though it will take a lot of work, there is still reason for optimism.   Jonathan Trusz is a current student at the Quinnipiac University School of Law, and a graduate from the University of Connecticut. He can be reached on LinkedIn under his name, or by email at [email protected] .   1. Noniewicz, 2024 (citing Plessow et al., 2020) https://www.noniewiczperformanceconsulting.com/resources/mental-health-in-professional-football   2. NFL Behavioral Health Agreement https://totalwellness.nfl.com/media/se1jzihz/behavioral-health-nfl-nflpa_cba_march_5_2020.pdf   3. NFL Player Care Foundation https://www.nfllifeline.org/resources/nfl-player-care-foundation/#:~:text=Comprehensive%20neurological%20care%20and%20support,for%20the%20cost%20of%20assessments.&text=To%20learn%20more%20about%20the,(800)%20635%2D4625 .   4. NFL Players Association https://nflpa.com/active-players/faq/what-is-a-credited-season-and-what-does-it-mean-to-be-vested   5. Takeaways from 2020 NFL-NFLPA Agreement https://operations.nfl.com/inside-football-ops/players-legends/2020-nfl-nflpa-cba-need-to-know/

The Athletic  recently reported that two small market baseball clubs – the Athletics and the Miami Marlins – are in jeopardy of having grievances filed against them for spending insufficient money on their player payrolls. [1]   This article uses those examples to explain Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement’s grievance process and revenue sharing program. Grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement The Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) is an agreement between the 30 Major League Baseball clubs (the “Clubs”) and the Major League Baseball Players Association (the “MLBPA”).  The CBA establishes the rights and responsibilities of the Clubs, the players, and the MLBPA, and “certain terms and conditions of employment” of all MLB players. [2]   The current CBA came into effect on March 10, 2022, and expires on December 1, 2026. The CBA allows MLB players and, in some instances, the MLBPA on behalf of players, to file grievances against the Clubs.  The CBA defines a grievance as “a complaint which involves the existence or interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement . . . between the [MLBPA] and the Clubs or any of them, or between a Player and a Club[.]” [3] Here are some notable examples of grievances filed under the CBA:  · In 2021, the MLBPA filed a grievance against MLB for failing to schedule more games during the COVID-shortened 2020 season. [4]   · In 2022, Trevor Bauer filed a grievance in connection with his suspension following allegations of sexual assault. [5]   · And, in 2001, the MLPBA filed a grievance against Club owners for threatening to contract two Clubs from MLB. [6] The grievance process begins when a player or the MLBPA provides notice of the grievance to a Club or the Clubs, after which the Club(s) responds to the grievance.  The parties to a grievance may resolve it on their own.  However, if a player or the MLBPA disagrees with a Club’s decision, the CBA also allows a player or the MLBPA to appeal the Club’s decision first to the Major League Baseball Labor Relations Department, and then, if necessary, to a panel of three arbitrators (the “Arbitration Panel”), headed by the panel chair.  The Arbitration Panel has jurisdiction and authority “to determine the existence of or compliance with, or to interpret or apply agreements or provisions of agreements between the [MLBPA] and the Clubs or any of them, or between individual Players and the Clubs.  The Arbitration Panel shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of such agreements.” [7] The Arbitration Panel’s decision regarding a grievance is effectively final:  In Major League Baseball Assn. v. Garvey , the Supreme Court held that an arbitrator’s decision will only be overturned if it is the result of fraud. [8] Revenue sharing and grievances for violations of the CBA’s revenue sharing policy The CBA’s revenue sharing program is designed to improve on-field competition, and the MLBPA may file a grievance against a Club that misuses proceeds received from that program.  Clubs receive revenues from nationally broadcast games and local sources like regional broadcast contracts, sponsorships, and sales of tickets, concessions, and merchandise. [9]   Obviously, Clubs in larger markets, like New York or Los Angeles, that have more lucrative television deals and bigger stadiums collect more local revenues than Clubs in smaller markets, like Milwaukee and Tampa Bay.  To attempt to even the playing field to some degree, the CBA’s revenue sharing plan redistributes a portion of those local revenues. [10] The calculation of how much money Clubs pay or receive under the revenue sharing program is complex.  Essentially, the program pools 48% of each Club’s local revenues, and that pool is redistributed equally among all Clubs.  [11]   As a result, a large market Club that generates a lot of local revenue ends up paying into the revenue sharing program more than it receives because 48% of its local revenues is greater than 48% of a smaller market Club’s revenues.  By contrast, a smaller market Club collects more from the revenue sharing program than it contributes.  Clubs that end up paying into the program are called revenue sharing payors, and Clubs that receive money from the program are called revenue sharing payees.  The revenue sharing program was created for the limited purpose of giving smaller market Clubs additional resources to improve their on-field performance.  Without disincentives built into it, however, owners of revenue sharing payees could abuse the program by saving  the proceeds of the revenue sharing program they receive rather than spending that money in ways designed to improve on-field performance.  As such, the CBA contains certain mechanisms to prevent that from happening.  For example, in 2022, a change in the new CBA introduced a lottery to determine the MLB Rule 4 Draft order (the “Amateur Draft”).  To disincentivize teams from tanking for lottery picks in the draft, the definition of the Amateur Draft was amended to say that revenue sharing payees cannot receive a lottery pick inside the top six selections in the Amateur Draft in three consecutive years. [12]   This rule was applied recently:  The Athletics, a frequent revenue sharing payee, could not receive a top-six pick in this year’s Amateur Draft because they had been revenue sharing payees for three years in a row. [13]   Similarly, revenue sharing payors cannot receive a top-six lottery pick two years in a row, a provision that disincentivizes large market Clubs from tanking. [14] Moreover, the CBA states that acceptable uses of the proceeds received from revenue sharing include extending current players’ contracts, signing free agents, purchasing training equipment, and investing in analytics that support player development.  Conversely, the CBA provides the following examples of uses of revenue sharing proceeds that are not consistent with this objective: · Payments to service acquisition debt or any other debt that is unrelated to past or future efforts to improve performance on the field; · Payments to individuals other than on-field personnel or personnel related to player development; · Payments to entities that do not have a direct role in improving on-field performance; and · Distributions to ownership that are not intended to offset tax obligations resulting from Club operations. [15] Furthermore, the CBA allows the MLPBA to file a grievance against a Club it believes did not use its revenue sharing proceeds to improve its on-field performance.  In any such grievance, the CBA requires the Arbitration Panel to consider the following: · The Club’s expenditures on scouting, player development, and player payroll; · The Club’s long-term strategy for improving competitiveness; · The Club’s historical use of revenue sharing receipts; · Any material adverse changes in local revenue; and · The Club’s overall financial position.  In this type of grievance, the MLBPA has the burden of demonstrating that the Club’s use of revenue sharing violates the CBA.  The burden flips to the Club, however, if the Club’s total player payroll is less than 150% of its revenue sharing receipts. [16]   The MLB commissioner may impose penalties against a Club that violates this provision of the CBA, including requiring the Club to submit a plan for its financial performance and competitive effort for the next two years. [17] Recent grievances related to the revenue sharing player payroll spending requirement A Club’s payroll is determined at the end of the season for purposes of the burden-shifting provision of the CBA.  Even so, pre-season payroll numbers can signal which Clubs may find themselves receiving a grievance from the MLBPA at the end of the season. For example, on December 9, 2024, Evan Drellich and Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic wrote an article warning that, even after signing Luis Severino to a three-year, $67 million contract in the offseason, the A’s needed to add more to their payroll to avoid receiving a grievance. [18]   The article estimated that the A’s needed to reach $105 million in payroll for competitive balance tax purposes to avoid tripping the burden-shifting provision of the CBA.  Since that article was published, the A’s signed free agents, including Gio Urshela, Jose Leclerc and Luis Urias; extended Brent Rooker and Lawrence Butler; and traded for Jeffrey Springs, increasing their payroll for competitive balance tax purposes in 2025 to approximately $115 million, according to Fangraphs. [19] While the A’s appear to have addressed their payroll concerns, the Marlins have not.  The Athletic  reported on March 18, 2025 that the Marlins were operating about $20 million below the CBA’s revenue sharing player payroll spending requirement. [20]   Since the article was published, the Marlins have made no significant changes to their 2025 payroll.  What’s worse, the article suggests that the Marlins are more likely to cut  salary by the end of the season than add it.  For example, the article predicts that Sandy Alcantara, whose salary is approximately $11.2 million for 2025, will be traded by this season’s trade deadline. [21] This is not the first time similar allegations have been made against the Marlins (or the A’s).  In 2018, the MLBPA filed a grievance against the Miami Marlins, Oakland Athletics, Pittsburgh Pirates, and Tampa Bay Rays, alleging that these four Clubs violated the CBA by misusing the money they received through MLB’s revenue sharing program.  That grievance was filed pursuant to the then-operative CBA, which has since expired.  However, that CBA – like the current one – required Clubs to use the revenue sharing proceeds “in an effort to improve [their] performance on the field.”  That grievance remains pending, and the MLBPA filed another grievance against some of the same Clubs in 2019. [22] Potential consequences for the Marlins What will happen to the Marlins if they do not increase their payroll remains an open question.  As an initial matter, if the Marlins’ payroll does not exceed the 150% threshold by the end of the season, they can still show that they used their revenue sharing proceeds to improve their on-field performance.  Perhaps anticipating that their payroll would not exceed the 150% threshold, at the start of spring training, Marlins owner Bruce Sherman and president of baseball operations Peter Bendix discussed improvements the Marlins had made in the offseason, including hiring “one of the largest front-office staffs in baseball,” bulking up the Marlins weight room, renovating their spring training facility, and building a player development complex in the Dominican Republic. [23]   Notably, these are the exact types of improvements the Marlins would likely point to in a grievance hearing as evidence that they had used their revenue sharing proceeds to improve on-field performance.  Even if the grievance is successful, however, it is unclear what penalties would be levied against the Marlins.  Perhaps Commissioner Rob Manfred would require the Marlins to submit a plan for its financial performance and competitive effort for the next two years as the CBA contemplates.  It is also possible that the MLBPA will use the grievance as leverage while negotiating the next CBA, which will happen in the not-too-distant future, as the current CBA is set to expire on December 1, 2026.  Maybe even the Marlins don’t know what will happen if they don’t increase their payroll, and maybe they don’t care.  As one rival executive put it, “They’re sort of saying, ‘There’s no precedent here.  We don’t know what the punishment will be.  We’ll just find out’.” [24]   So will we.  John Kane is a lawyer and a sports fan.  His Twitter handle is @JKane_Sports. Sources: [1] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” Evan Drellich and Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic , December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ ; “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ . [2] CBA Article I.  [3]  CBA Article XI(A)(1)(a). [4] “MLB players union seeking $500 million in grievance against league,” Jon Sherman, New York Post , May 13, 20201, https://nypost.com/2021/05/13/mlb-players-union-seeks-500-million-in-grievance-against-league/ . [5]  “Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Trevor Bauer’s grievance hearing against Major League Baseball to begin May 23, sources say,” Alden Gonzalez, ESPN , May 13, 2022, https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/33910887/los-angeles-dodgers-pitcher-trevor-bauer-grievance-hearing-major-league-baseball-begin-23-source-says . [6]  “Settling the dispute,” Darren Rovell, ESPN , November 14, 2001, https://www.espn.com/mlb/s/2001/1113/1277749.html . [7]  CBA Article XI(B). [8]  532 U.S. 504 (2001). [9] Revenues from nationally broadcast games are split equally among all Clubs. [10] The revenue sharing program is not to be confused with the Competitive Balance Tax (the “ CBT ”), the tiered tax on Clubs who exceed certain payroll thresholds.  The proceeds of those taxes are used towards players’ benefits, retirement plans, and a fund that rewards local clubs for growing their non-media local revenue.  See  CBA Article XXIII((H)(2)(b). [11]  CBA Article XXIV(A)(9)-(10).   [12] “Rule 4 Draft,” https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/rule-4-draft (“[R]evenue sharing payees are ineligible to receive lottery selections in three consecutive years[.]”). [13] “A’s content with 11th pick, despite Draft Lottery ineligibility,” Martin Gallegos, MLB.com ,  https://www.mlb.com/news/athletics-land-11th-pick-after-being-ineligible-for-draft-lottery . [14] “Rule 4 Draft,” https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/rule-4-draft (“[N]on-payees are ineligible to receive lottery selections in consecutive years.”). [15]  CBA Article XXIV(B)(5)(a). [16]  CBA Article XXIV(B)(5)(a). [17]   Id. [18] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” The Athletic, December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ .  [19] https://www.fangraphs.com/roster-resource/payroll/athletics . [20] “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ .                [21] Id. [22] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” The Athletic, December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ .  [23] “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ . [24] Id.