Malik Beasley just had one of his best seasons statistically  of his career with the Detroit Pistons in the 2024-25 NBA season, averaging 16.3 points, 1.7 assists, 2.6 rebounds, and shot a career-high 41.6% from three-point land. Beasley played a major role in helping the Pistons end a six-year playoff drought, helping the Pistons reach the NBA playoffs this season, and Beasley was a finalist for the NBA’s Sixth Man of the Year Award this season. But now Beasley has run into some potential legal trouble as he finds himself being sued by his former agency, Hazan Sports Management (HSM). Specifically, HSM, now Beasley’s former agency is suing Beasley for breach of contract and related claims, where they allege  Beasley owes at least $1 million in damages. HSM claims that when Beasley became a client on November 27, 2023, by signing him to a standard player agent contract (SPAC), they also paid Beasley $650,000 in advance as part of a separate player marketing agreement which granted HSM exclusive marketing rights that would be for a term of four years. HSM alleges after helping Beasley resuscitate his career by securing him a one-year, $6 million contract with the Detroit Pistons, Beasley fired HSM as his on-court representation earlier this year in February and breached the exclusivity provisions of the marketing agreement when he hired Brian Jungreis of Seros Partners to serve as his on-court agent and marketing representative just 15 months into the four-year agreement as HSM alleges. HSM states that when they took Beasley on as a client, he was a player with “known issues,” issues that included financial ones. The substantial marketing advance of $650,000 to Beasley as the agency claims was to in part help those financial issues of Beasley and to become his exclusive marketing agent as HSM expected Beasley would turn around his career where Beasley’s marketing rights would become valuable and generate high commissions for HSM. The player marketing agreement included a liquidated damages clause that requires Beasley to pay HSM $1 million in the event that the agreement is terminated for any reason prior to the end of the four-year term. The liquidated damages clause of $1 million is one of the claims HSM is seeking judgment on against Beasley. It remains to be seen whether this liquidated damages clause in this matter between Beasley and HSM will be enforceable under New York law. If the case does move forward, an anticipated defense that Beasley can bring forward is that the liquidated damages clause in this contract with HSM is not fair and reasonable, therefore being an unenforceable penalty clause as New York law requires  liquidated damages clauses to bear a reasonable relation to anticipated or actual damages in order to not be a contract provision for an unreasonably large liquidated damage amount which is void as a penalty. To counter this, as HSM has already stated this in the complaint, is that both parties agreed and accepted that this liquidated damages provision in the amount of $1 million in the event of a breach was “fair and acceptable in the light of the amount of the Marketing Advance and the risk assumed by Marketing Agent with respect to the Marketing Advance.” The player marketing contract states that “any and all disputes” arising out of it “shall be adjudicated” by a New York court. This is important because this leads the dispute of the marketing agreement to litigation instead of arbitration which is a standard clause in all SPAC’s where the arbitration clause covers disputes between a player and their agents concerning their contractual relationship. Notably, HSM is not alleging that Beasley breached his SPAC with the agency, but rather tying the breach claim to the marketing contract, so in this instance Beasley would not be able to have the complaint dismissed through claiming that it must first be heard by an arbitrator. This case highlights and shows the importance of enforceability of such agreements, and the factors that can lead to one being successful in dismissing such a suit or being successful in recovering damages from the other side. It also shows what can entice players to sign such player-agent contracts, such as marketing guarantees, cash advances, and other inducements. As of now Beasley has not responded to this suit brought against him by HSM and no lawyer has appeared on his behalf on this matter. Romen Richardson is a rising 3L at Howard University School of Law in Washington, DC. He aspires to be a prominent sports & entertainment attorney after graduating law school, and also hopes to one day be an NBA Agent. You can follow him here on LinkedIn .

The NCAA’s transfer portal was created to give student-athletes greater autonomy, the freedom to explore new opportunities and make decisions that align with their academic and athletic goals. For high school prospects, the recruiting process similarly aimed to empower athletes to choose the best path for their future. Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) reforms were intended to complement this freedom, finally allowing athletes to be compensated for the value they bring to their schools and communities. However, what began as a framework for empowerment and fair compensation has quickly morphed into something far more complicated: a quasi-pay-for-play system where inducements masquerade as endorsements and recruiting has escalated into an arms race funded by third-party NIL collectives. The Rise of NIL Collectives: A Legal Gray Zone These third-party NIL collectives are donor-funded groups that pool money to support athletes at specific schools. [1] These collectives have become powerful players in the transfer process. Functioning as intermediaries between schools and athletes, many collectives now offer upfront guarantees of NIL compensation as a condition of transferring or enrolling, echoing the salary negotiations of professional sports. This raises a critical question: if NIL deals are structured to induce athletes to enroll or transfer to specific schools, are we witnessing a covert violation of amateurism or its outright collapse? Case Study: Jaden Rashada and the NIL Fallout No case better illustrates this murky legal area than that of Jaden Rashada, a highly touted high school quarterback. In late 2022, Rashada reportedly signed an NIL deal with a Florida-based collective valued at $13.85 million, contingent upon his enrollment at the University of Florida. [2] When the collective failed to deliver on its financial promises, the deal unraveled. Rashada decommitted from Florida and ultimately enrolled at Arizona State. [3] The fallout from this agreement exposed the transactional nature of many NIL deals and the risks inherent in unregulated, donor-driven collectives. While no NCAA violations were officially alleged, the saga sparked widespread debate over whether NIL has turned recruiting into open bidding wars, challenging the NCAA’s guidelines. Rashada’s experience highlights the fragile position of young athletes promised life-changing sums, only to find themselves entangled in contractual disputes and legal ambiguity before ever stepping foot on the field. The NCAA’s Enforcement Challenges The NCAA maintains that NIL compensation must not be used as a recruiting inducement or tied directly to athletic performance. [4] Under NCAA guidelines, NIL agreements must be for legitimate services, such as endorsements, social media promotions, or public appearances. [5] Compensation cannot be contingent on committing to a specific school, nor can schools or collectives directly guarantee NIL deals for recruits or transfers. [6] Yet, in practice, these rules have proven nearly impossible to enforce. Universities enjoy plausible deniability, as collectives operate independently on paper, even while advancing the schools' interests. High school prospects and transfer portal athletes are swiftly contacted by collectives tied formally or informally to prospective programs. These collectives often offer six- or seven-figure deals, contingent on enrollment or transfer decisions. As a result, while schools claim separation from the process, collectives continue to exploit the gap between NCAA policy and practical reality. Legal Exposure and Future Litigation Risks As the NIL marketplace grows, the blurred line between permissible activity and impermissible inducements is drawing increased legal and regulatory scrutiny. While the NCAA has stepped up enforcement, courts have frequently ruled against restrictions on athlete compensation, citing antitrust concerns, most notably in  NCAA v. Alston , [7]  where the Supreme Court unanimously found the NCAA’s limits on education-related benefits to be unlawful. More litigation is inevitable. Some state legislatures have passed laws allowing schools to play a more active role in NIL deals, directly conflicting with NCAA regulations. [8] Federal intervention also looms, with multiple proposed bills aiming to establish a national standard for NIL governance. For universities, collectives, and athletes alike, the legal landscape remains unsettled. Without clearer guardrails, whether through NCAA reform, state law harmonization, or federal regulation, the quasi-professional model of college sports will continue to evolve in unpredictable ways. The Future of Amateurism The convergence of the transfer portal, NIL opportunities, and the growing influence of collectives has transformed recruiting and transfers into a full-blown competitive marketplace. What started as an effort to enhance athlete autonomy has inadvertently accelerated the erosion of amateurism and upended the collegiate sports model. Unless the NCAA and lawmakers can reconcile athlete compensation with the preservation of competitive integrity, the line between college and professional sports will continue to blur, perhaps irreversibly. Sade Frazier is an attorney and Sports Lawyers Association NextGen Committee member, passionate about how NIL, IP, tech, and media are shaping the future of sports law. Learn more at www.linkedin.com/in/sadefrazier .   Sources: [1]  Pete Nakos, What are NIL Collectives and How Do They Operate? , On3 (July 6, 2022), https://www.on3.com/nil/news/what-are-nil-collectives-and-how-do-they-operate/ . [2]  Thomas Hunt & Kyle Stroup, A $13.85 Million NIL Deal Gone Wrong: Jaden Rashada Sues University of Florida , JD Supra (June 26, 2024), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-13-85-million-nil-deal-gone-wrong-4508505/#:~:text=The%20Recruitment%20and%20NIL%20Agreement,remaining%20$13.35%20million%20to%20follow . [3]   Id . [4]  Twane Duckworth and Mike Williams, Understanding NIL Rights for College Athletes , WTW (Dec. 20, 2024), https://www.wtwco.com/en-us/insights/2024/12/understanding-nil-rights-for-college-athletes . [5]   Id. [6]   Id. [7]  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 1 (2021). [8]   NIL College Rules , On3, https://www.on3.com/nil/laws/college/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2025).

New York basketball is starting May off strong, and I'm not talking about the Knicks leading the Celtics 3-1. Knicks and Rangers fans, get excited to welcome a new tea partner to MSG. Though really it is the Liberty who are stealing the show, signing multiple partnership agreements in advance of their home opener this Saturday, May 17th. New York Liberty and Liberty Mutual sign jersey deal. Liberty Mutual's logo will be featured on the jerseys below the players' names. Yahoo Sports New York Liberty and Rihanna's Fenty brand sign partnership. As part of the deal, the Liberty's pre-game warm-up jackets and shooting shirts will feature the Fenty logo. Vogue Business MSG names Snapple its Official Tea Partner. Snapple to be the Official Tea Partner of the Knicks, Rangers and MSG. Snapple will be featured on digital signage throughout MSG on game days. Snapple will also host sampling opportunities, and a "Statue of Liber-Tea" photo opportunity. MSG Kirsten Flicker is a graduate of Fordham University School of Law from the class of 2021. She can be found on LinkedIn here .

In the midst of the college football Name, Image, and Likeness (“NIL”) era, nothing says “we need some guardrails” quite like the Iamaleava debacle. Within the past week, both Nico Iamaleava (“Nico”), Tennessee’s starting quarterback, and his brother, Arkansas early enrollee Madden Iamaleava have both hit the transfer portal – despite being in superficially strong positions – leaving college football fans across the country scratching their heads. With the NCAA v. House settlement on hold, Trump administration’s rescission of Title IX guidance for NIL, and state of college football at a critical juncture, the straightforward question remains, though the answer is anything but simple: what comes next?   Nico, the former starting quarterback for the university of Tennessee has sent college football into a frenzy with his latest moves and rumored demands for exorbitant sums of money. For context, Nico’s contract with Tennessee of roughly $8 million over three years made him one of the highest-paid players in college football. Despite zero threat of losing his starting job at the SEC powerhouse, he recently sought to restructure his deal to the tune of around $4 million per year. While he was a highly touted signal caller out of high school and certainly displayed some flashes his freshman year, many would argue Nico did not warrant a higher salary. After failed negotiations with Tennessee and his absence at multiple practices, he and the team decided to part ways. Nico recently committed to UCLA, and ironically, he’ll be earning less per year at a school with a football program miles behind the University of Tennessee in terms of prominence, success, and development. Funny enough, UCLA quarterback Joey Aguilar entered the portal and committed to Tennessee in the wake of Nico’s decision, effectively marking what could be considered the first ever college football trade. While Nico’s father denied that money was the core issue, numerous reports and indications suggest this was likely a strategy to secure a higher payout.   Just when you thought Nico entering the portal was wild, the plot has thickened as his younger brother recently decided to join him by entering the portal and heading to UCLA. Nico’s younger brother, Madden Iamaleava (“Madden”), was a four star recruit in the class of 2025 poised to compete for the starting job at Arkansas. Although Madden was initially committed to UCLA, the time of the decision raises some questions. While it’s true both Iamaleava’s are from Southern California, why would they suddenly leave big SEC programs with bright futures to return home together at the same school? What prompted the change? Let’s not sugarcoat it – money’s likely at play, and college football fans aren’t exactly thrilled.   The Iamaleava debacle is making headlines, but more importantly, it’s reinforcing growing concerns about NIL in college sports. So much so that the University of Arkansas’ NIL collective, Arkansas Edge, is reportedly demanding around $200,000 from Madden, who entered the portal just after spring camp. This represents close to half of Madden’s alleged $500,000 contract, signed in December. Amidst calls for buyouts in college football athlete contracts, it would come as a surprise that many NIL contracts already have buyout clauses, though few have been enforced until now. So why the reluctance to enforce such provisions? For one, suing 18-19 year-olds does not reflect well on any school. However, the recent surge in contract breaches suggests this enforcement of such provisions might become commonplace. Given reports that Nico was under a three-year deal, he could potentially be the next subject of legal action especially in light of how he left Knoxville.   So, what is the answer? It’s no secret that the majority of college football fans are deeply frustrated with the current state of the sport, and there’s little appetite to see a perpetual free agency in college sports. Over the past year – and specifically in recent weeks – many now believe the only viable solution is granting college athletes employee status and implementing collective bargaining to ensure loyalty to schools. In NCAA v. Johnson, the Third Circuit allowed the athletes’ claims to proceed, as opposed to dismissing them outright. If successful, the athletes could reshape the landscape of college athletics. With athletes under employment status, schools would not hesitate to strictly enforce buyout provisions. Moreover, the House v. NCAA offers a glimmer of hope and change. The proposed settlement includes $2.8 billion in back pay for current and former athletes, reduced roster sizes, and a new revenue-sharing model that allows schools to directly pay student-athletes. Considering the National Labor Relations Board generally governs unionization and collective bargaining, it appears employment status would be necessary for such changes to be made. However, there are plenty of critics to that approach, with many believing the NCAA should take the lead in implementing reforms on its own. Unfortunately, the NCAA might have missed the boat for leading on this issue, as implementing such changes could likely expose the organization to antitrust liability.   The final twist comes with the influence of the Trump administration and Republican control across all branches of government. Before former President Joe Biden left office, his administration issued in January of 2025, guidance stating that NIL compensation, even from third parties, should be distributed in a nondiscriminatory manner based on Title IX. Considering the Trump Administration has been less supportive of extensive regulation regarding NIL, it comes as no surprise that his administration rescinded the Title IX guidance issued from Biden.   The future of college football remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: it’s a full-blown disaster. Given the passion, camaraderie, and unity that comes with the sport, a solution must be hammered out soon, or we’ll keep seeing situations like the Iamaleava brothers popping up left and right - college football and college sports as a whole, deserve better.

I.         Background Although Nico Iamaleava dominated headlines in the past month before transferring to UCLA, it is his younger brother, Madden Iamaleava, who has found himself in the middle of controversy as of late. A four-star quarterback recruit, Madden Iamaleava initially committed to UCLA but flipped his commitment to the University of Arkansas on December 4, 2024. [i] He enrolled in January 2025 but announced his intention to transfer back to UCLA just four months and zero snaps of competitive football later, following his brother Nico Iamaleava’s lead. [ii] This decision raised concerns among the University of Arkansas and its NIL collective, Arkansas Edge, particularly since Madden had not participated in any athletic competition and had reportedly received up to $500,000 in NIL-related compensation. [iii]   In response to Iamaleava’s decision to transfer, Athletic Director Hunter Yurachek issued a public statement supporting Arkansas Edge’s efforts to enforce repayment provisions embedded in NIL agreements. [iv] This support reflects a growing concern within collegiate athletics regarding the accountability of student-athletes receiving NIL funds without fulfilling corresponding obligations.     II.         Breach of Contract Framework Under Arkansas Law Under Arkansas law, each of the following four elements are necessary to sustain a breach of contract claim: (1) The existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) The obligation of the defendant under that contract; (3) A violation of the contract terms by the defendant; and (4) Resulting damages suffered by the plaintiff. [v] Each of these elements must be supported by credible evidence and fact-specific analysis.   III.         Application of Arkansas Contract Law to the Madden Iamaleava Case o   Existence of an Enforceable Contract: Reports indicate that Madden Iamaleava signed a one-year NIL agreement with Arkansas Edge. This agreement included a buyout clause stipulating that if the athlete breached the agreement, such as by transferring before the contract's term expired, he would be responsible for repaying 50% of the contract’s remaining value. [vi] o   Obligations and Breach: While it cannot be confirmed without a review of the signed contract, the Arkansas Edge agreement likely required Madden to perform promotional, social media, or appearance-related events in exchange for financial compensation. His transfer prior to the fulfillment of these obligations could constitute a material breach. The issue of whether he provided any of these obligations before departure would be fact-specific and critical to determining liability. o   Damages: Damages in contract law are intended to compensate the injured party for the loss. In this case, Arkansas Edge would need to demonstrate that they suffered quantifiable economic harm. This could include the loss of promotional opportunities, brand value, or reputational benefits anticipated from Madden’s participation.  IV.         Challenges in Proving Damages: o   Uncertainty Around Value : One of the most significant hurdles is the speculative nature of anticipated NIL benefits. As the opportunity for Iamaleava to perform had not yet occurred, the collective is left to argue about the hypothetical value of branding exposure, promotional opportunities, or reputational gains that might have happened. Courts are generally reluctant to award damages based on conjecture, and without clear, objective indicators of value, claims risk being dismissed as too uncertain. o   Lack of Performance Data : Since Iamaleava did not play and it is unclear if he performed NIL obligations, there are no engagement numbers, media impressions, or fan interactions that could help estimate what the NIL efforts might have been worth. Without those metrics, any estimate becomes highly uncertain. o   Comparability Issues : Valuing NIL deals often involves comparing the agreement to similar arrangements in the market. However, there may be very few comparable deals involving athletes with similar profiles or market value. Even where other NIL deals exist, differences in athlete profile, brand reach, and contract terms can undermine their usefulness as comparisons. o   Causation : The collective must prove that the loss resulted directly from the breach and not from other intervening events.    V.         Statutory Support The Arkansas Publicity Rights Act, as significantly amended by Act 589 (Ark. 2023), provides a legal framework for enforcing NIL contracts. This law confirms that student-athletes in Arkansas have the right to be paid for the use of their name, image, and likeness and it also expands the tools available to universities and related organizations to respond when those agreements are violated.  It states: "A university may bring a cause of action against any individual or entity who induces a student-athlete to breach an NIL contract when that athlete has already signed an enrollment agreement with the university." [vii]  VI.         Application by Arkansas NIL Collectives The revised law extends legal standing not only to universities, but also to their "supporting foundations or authorized entities." This means groups like Arkansas Edge, which describes itself as working to support University of Arkansas athletes and using the university's brand and connections, may potentially be treated as an "authorized entity" with the right to sue in court. [viii] , [ix] This language is especially important because it may allow Arkansas Edge to directly file a lawsuit without having to go through the university. If another school’s boosters or NIL collective offered money to entice Madden Iamaleava to transfer and terminate his deal, Arkansas Edge may be able to argue that this was a clear violation of the law and sue for damages. The statute also strengthens enforcement by allowing recovery not just for actual financial losses but also for punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs. This creates a strong deterrent against any tampering. [x] Simply put, the law also prohibits anyone from promising NIL money to a player already committed to an Arkansas school as a way to get them to switch schools. That provision is relevant in the Iamaleava case, if any NIL transfer conversations happened while he was under contract with Arkansas. [xi] This statutory update shows Arkansas’s proactive stance in attempting to regulate the constantly evolving NIL environment. It offers universities and their partners clear legal pathways if they are harmed by unethical or unlawful acts. The law provides collectives such as Arkansas Edge with safeguards against unauthorized recruitment efforts and establishes a way to recover compensation if a student-athlete breaches their NIL agreement. VII.         NIL Buyout Clauses Buyout clauses are becoming more common in NIL deals, especially with high-profile recruits. These clauses are designed to protect collectives by allowing them to recover some money if an athlete leaves before the contract ends. Still, whether these clauses can be enforced in court depends on the specific facts of each case. Courts usually look at whether the buyout is a fair estimate of potential losses or just a way to punish the athlete. For a buyout clause to hold up legally, it must: o   Represent a reasonable estimate of anticipated loss at the time the contract was formed; o   Not be punitive in nature; and o   Be clearly written in the contract. Attorney Darren Heitner explains that buyouts characterized as penalties are less likely to be upheld in court. However, if they are a fair estimation of harm from lost NIL activities, they may be valid. [xii] Mit Winter adds that collectives must demonstrate how the loss of an athlete’s NIL value translates into measurable economic harm and that without this demonstration, courts may deem the buyout clause unenforceable [xiii] . VIII.         Challenges of NIL Enforcement Even if Arkansas Edge possesses a solid legal foundation to pursue breach of contract or statutory claims, broader practical and reputational concerns must be weighed carefully before initiating formal legal action. The NIL environment is not only governed by law but also shaped by public perception. o   Reputation Risk: Bringing a lawsuit against a young student-athlete, especially one who may be perceived as making a personal or family-driven choice, can be viewed negatively by the public and also potential recruits. The narrative of a powerful collective suing an 18-year-old could be damaging to the University of Arkansas’s broader athletic brand. Such action may also give the impression that Arkansas is inflexible or hostile to athlete mobility, potentially deterring future prospects from engaging with the program. o   Enforceability: Collecting on a judgment can be difficult. Even if a court rules in favor of Arkansas Edge, collecting on a judgment may pose significant challenges especially if they have not yet achieved any commercial success. A favorable ruling without meaningful enforcement may have limited practical impact. o   Negotiation Leverage: Often, demand letters serve to open negotiations rather than enforce payment in full. A settlement may offer faster resolution, reduced reputational damage to the Collective, and limit reputational damage in the court of public opinion. o   Policy Trends: As states move toward legislation allowing schools to pay athletes directly, contract structures and enforcement mechanisms may evolve further. Incentive-based compensation plans may reduce the risks associated with upfront lump-sum payments.  IX.         Conclusion Arkansas Edge likely has a legitimate argument that Madden Iamaleava breached his NIL contract by transferring to another university before fulfilling the terms of the agreement. The existence of a buyout clause, combined with support from Arkansas contract law and specific provisions under Act 589, gives the collective a potentially strong legal position. However, whether Arkansas Edge can successfully enforce the contract depends on more than just having the law on its side. The outcome will largely rest on the specific language used in the agreement and whether the collective can clearly show how it was financially harmed by Iamaleava’s early departure. Proving such losses in court may be difficult, especially if they are measured by intangibles like publicity or fan engagement. This situation highlights a major issue in the NIL landscape. How do we balance the rights of student-athletes to make personal and career decisions with the expectations of universities and NIL collectives that invest significant resources in these athletes. As NIL agreements become more commonplace and more complex, clearer legal standards, contract language, and policies will be essential. Both athletes and collectives deserve a system that is fair. A stable NIL environment will depend not only on strong contracts and clear NCAA standards, but also on mutual understanding and respect between institutions and student-athletes [i] Madden Iamaleava (@MaddenIamaleava), X (Apr. 21, 2025, 6:55 PM), https://x.com/MaddenIamaleava/status/1864417254101930392 . [ii] On3 Sports (@On3sports), X (Apr. 17, 2025, 3:10 PM), https://x.com/On3sports/status/1914473758292639946 . [iii] Yurachek, Arkansas Edge Make Bold Statement , Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Apr. 24, 2025), https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2025/apr/24/yurachek-arkansas-edge-make-bold-statement/ . [iv] Pete Nakos, Arkansas AD Hunter Yurachek Enforcing NIL Buyouts for Madden Iamaleava , On3 (Apr. 24, 2025), https://www.on3.com/nil/news/arkansas-athletic-director-hunter-yurachek-enforcing-nil-buyouts-madden-iamaleava/ . [v] Smith v. Eisen , 245 S.W.3d 160, 168–69 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) [vi] Amanda Christovich, Will Arkansas Spur an NIL Buyout Crackdown? , Front Office Sports (Apr. 24, 2025), https://frontofficesports.com/will-arkansas-spur-an-nil-buyout-crackdown/ . [vii] (Act 589, § 4-75-1308(b)) [viii] (§ 4-75-1308(b)(2), Act 589). [ix] What We Do , Arkansas Edge NIL, https://arkansasedgenil.com/pages/what-we-do . [x] (§ 4-75-1308(c), Act 589). [xi] (§ 4-75-1308(b)(1), Act 589). [xii] Amanda Christovich, Will Arkansas Spur an NIL Buyout Crackdown? , Front Office Sports (Apr. 24, 2025), https://frontofficesports.com/will-arkansas-spur-an-nil-buyout-crackdown/ . [xiii] Amanda Christovich, Will Arkansas Spur an NIL Buyout Crackdown? , Front Office Sports (Apr. 24, 2025), https://frontofficesports.com/will-arkansas-spur-an-nil-buyout-crackdown/ .

The National Football League is one of the most powerful organizations in the sports realm, and yet, there has been limited progress made in the promotion of mental health. There have been many tragic stories that have been a result of a lack of mental health services, and there is clearly something that needs to be done.   With an increased focus on mental health in former professional football players, there comes a need for increased legislation in the area. Medical studies have shown that having a playing professional football is generally associated with increased mental health problems, with an additional risk to those who have suffered concussions at some point in their career. In a study of 2500 former NFL players, depression rates were as high as 11.1%.1 For the sake of comparison, the nationwide rate of depression in men 20-39 is 5.5%, dipping to 5.2% in men 40-59, and sharply rising to 6.1% for men above 60.1 This, along with the fact that both men and football players have a low rate of reporting mental health problems, creates a dangerous circumstance in which there is a lack of, and a clear need for, legislation regulating mental health in football.1   Given these startling statistics, the National Football League has not drastically updated their mental health promotion programs since 2019, with the release of the Behavior Health Agreement.2 Given that these mental health statistics are from 2020, there is still more work to be done. Football is an inherently violent sport, and therefore the players should be afforded the most protection possible, to both their physical and mental health.   Additionally, former NFL players are not awarded lifetime health insurance. In terms of neurological care, this is cared for by the NFL Player Care Foundation.3 However, players are responsible for most of the assessments, care, and travel unless they fit the requirements of a “vested player.” This only applies to players who have played at least three NFL games in three seasons.4 This needs to be expanded, as it only takes one game for a player to suffer a concussion and therefore have an expanded range of potential mental health problems. This is a major issue, given that mental health problems can lead to lifelong difficulties, and yet there is only a subsection of the former population of players that are able to benefit by the long-term healthcare plans of the league. The NFL is one of the highest-profile businesses in the nation. Though it is still just that, a business, the long-term mental health of current and former players still needs to come first. The need for expanded healthcare plans for former players has never been greater, even with greater resources and science that has recently been developed in order to enhance player safety. The recent medical developments and enhancements to increase mental health awareness mean nothing for former players already impacted by the violent sport if there is nothing done to expand coverage. The statistics don’t lie and given that there is such a concern for mental health nowadays, there needs to be expanded action that matches that concern.   There’s no easy solution to this problem, as it would be costly, and an agreement would need to be made between both the NFL and the NFLPA. Though there was the agreement that was made in 2020, it still didn’t do nearly enough to improve help for former players.5 This agreement kept in place the subset of players that get healthcare benefits, and even though it was expanded to players with three credited NFL seasons, as noted before, it still does not cover all former NFL players, which is the goal for the future. Though it will take a lot of work, there is still reason for optimism.   Jonathan Trusz is a current student at the Quinnipiac University School of Law, and a graduate from the University of Connecticut. He can be reached on LinkedIn under his name, or by email at [email protected] .   1. Noniewicz, 2024 (citing Plessow et al., 2020) https://www.noniewiczperformanceconsulting.com/resources/mental-health-in-professional-football   2. NFL Behavioral Health Agreement https://totalwellness.nfl.com/media/se1jzihz/behavioral-health-nfl-nflpa_cba_march_5_2020.pdf   3. NFL Player Care Foundation https://www.nfllifeline.org/resources/nfl-player-care-foundation/#:~:text=Comprehensive%20neurological%20care%20and%20support,for%20the%20cost%20of%20assessments.&text=To%20learn%20more%20about%20the,(800)%20635%2D4625 .   4. NFL Players Association https://nflpa.com/active-players/faq/what-is-a-credited-season-and-what-does-it-mean-to-be-vested   5. Takeaways from 2020 NFL-NFLPA Agreement https://operations.nfl.com/inside-football-ops/players-legends/2020-nfl-nflpa-cba-need-to-know/

The Athletic  recently reported that two small market baseball clubs – the Athletics and the Miami Marlins – are in jeopardy of having grievances filed against them for spending insufficient money on their player payrolls. [1]   This article uses those examples to explain Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement’s grievance process and revenue sharing program. Grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement The Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) is an agreement between the 30 Major League Baseball clubs (the “Clubs”) and the Major League Baseball Players Association (the “MLBPA”).  The CBA establishes the rights and responsibilities of the Clubs, the players, and the MLBPA, and “certain terms and conditions of employment” of all MLB players. [2]   The current CBA came into effect on March 10, 2022, and expires on December 1, 2026. The CBA allows MLB players and, in some instances, the MLBPA on behalf of players, to file grievances against the Clubs.  The CBA defines a grievance as “a complaint which involves the existence or interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement . . . between the [MLBPA] and the Clubs or any of them, or between a Player and a Club[.]” [3] Here are some notable examples of grievances filed under the CBA:  · In 2021, the MLBPA filed a grievance against MLB for failing to schedule more games during the COVID-shortened 2020 season. [4]   · In 2022, Trevor Bauer filed a grievance in connection with his suspension following allegations of sexual assault. [5]   · And, in 2001, the MLPBA filed a grievance against Club owners for threatening to contract two Clubs from MLB. [6] The grievance process begins when a player or the MLBPA provides notice of the grievance to a Club or the Clubs, after which the Club(s) responds to the grievance.  The parties to a grievance may resolve it on their own.  However, if a player or the MLBPA disagrees with a Club’s decision, the CBA also allows a player or the MLBPA to appeal the Club’s decision first to the Major League Baseball Labor Relations Department, and then, if necessary, to a panel of three arbitrators (the “Arbitration Panel”), headed by the panel chair.  The Arbitration Panel has jurisdiction and authority “to determine the existence of or compliance with, or to interpret or apply agreements or provisions of agreements between the [MLBPA] and the Clubs or any of them, or between individual Players and the Clubs.  The Arbitration Panel shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of such agreements.” [7] The Arbitration Panel’s decision regarding a grievance is effectively final:  In Major League Baseball Assn. v. Garvey , the Supreme Court held that an arbitrator’s decision will only be overturned if it is the result of fraud. [8] Revenue sharing and grievances for violations of the CBA’s revenue sharing policy The CBA’s revenue sharing program is designed to improve on-field competition, and the MLBPA may file a grievance against a Club that misuses proceeds received from that program.  Clubs receive revenues from nationally broadcast games and local sources like regional broadcast contracts, sponsorships, and sales of tickets, concessions, and merchandise. [9]   Obviously, Clubs in larger markets, like New York or Los Angeles, that have more lucrative television deals and bigger stadiums collect more local revenues than Clubs in smaller markets, like Milwaukee and Tampa Bay.  To attempt to even the playing field to some degree, the CBA’s revenue sharing plan redistributes a portion of those local revenues. [10] The calculation of how much money Clubs pay or receive under the revenue sharing program is complex.  Essentially, the program pools 48% of each Club’s local revenues, and that pool is redistributed equally among all Clubs.  [11]   As a result, a large market Club that generates a lot of local revenue ends up paying into the revenue sharing program more than it receives because 48% of its local revenues is greater than 48% of a smaller market Club’s revenues.  By contrast, a smaller market Club collects more from the revenue sharing program than it contributes.  Clubs that end up paying into the program are called revenue sharing payors, and Clubs that receive money from the program are called revenue sharing payees.  The revenue sharing program was created for the limited purpose of giving smaller market Clubs additional resources to improve their on-field performance.  Without disincentives built into it, however, owners of revenue sharing payees could abuse the program by saving  the proceeds of the revenue sharing program they receive rather than spending that money in ways designed to improve on-field performance.  As such, the CBA contains certain mechanisms to prevent that from happening.  For example, in 2022, a change in the new CBA introduced a lottery to determine the MLB Rule 4 Draft order (the “Amateur Draft”).  To disincentivize teams from tanking for lottery picks in the draft, the definition of the Amateur Draft was amended to say that revenue sharing payees cannot receive a lottery pick inside the top six selections in the Amateur Draft in three consecutive years. [12]   This rule was applied recently:  The Athletics, a frequent revenue sharing payee, could not receive a top-six pick in this year’s Amateur Draft because they had been revenue sharing payees for three years in a row. [13]   Similarly, revenue sharing payors cannot receive a top-six lottery pick two years in a row, a provision that disincentivizes large market Clubs from tanking. [14] Moreover, the CBA states that acceptable uses of the proceeds received from revenue sharing include extending current players’ contracts, signing free agents, purchasing training equipment, and investing in analytics that support player development.  Conversely, the CBA provides the following examples of uses of revenue sharing proceeds that are not consistent with this objective: · Payments to service acquisition debt or any other debt that is unrelated to past or future efforts to improve performance on the field; · Payments to individuals other than on-field personnel or personnel related to player development; · Payments to entities that do not have a direct role in improving on-field performance; and · Distributions to ownership that are not intended to offset tax obligations resulting from Club operations. [15] Furthermore, the CBA allows the MLPBA to file a grievance against a Club it believes did not use its revenue sharing proceeds to improve its on-field performance.  In any such grievance, the CBA requires the Arbitration Panel to consider the following: · The Club’s expenditures on scouting, player development, and player payroll; · The Club’s long-term strategy for improving competitiveness; · The Club’s historical use of revenue sharing receipts; · Any material adverse changes in local revenue; and · The Club’s overall financial position.  In this type of grievance, the MLBPA has the burden of demonstrating that the Club’s use of revenue sharing violates the CBA.  The burden flips to the Club, however, if the Club’s total player payroll is less than 150% of its revenue sharing receipts. [16]   The MLB commissioner may impose penalties against a Club that violates this provision of the CBA, including requiring the Club to submit a plan for its financial performance and competitive effort for the next two years. [17] Recent grievances related to the revenue sharing player payroll spending requirement A Club’s payroll is determined at the end of the season for purposes of the burden-shifting provision of the CBA.  Even so, pre-season payroll numbers can signal which Clubs may find themselves receiving a grievance from the MLBPA at the end of the season. For example, on December 9, 2024, Evan Drellich and Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic wrote an article warning that, even after signing Luis Severino to a three-year, $67 million contract in the offseason, the A’s needed to add more to their payroll to avoid receiving a grievance. [18]   The article estimated that the A’s needed to reach $105 million in payroll for competitive balance tax purposes to avoid tripping the burden-shifting provision of the CBA.  Since that article was published, the A’s signed free agents, including Gio Urshela, Jose Leclerc and Luis Urias; extended Brent Rooker and Lawrence Butler; and traded for Jeffrey Springs, increasing their payroll for competitive balance tax purposes in 2025 to approximately $115 million, according to Fangraphs. [19] While the A’s appear to have addressed their payroll concerns, the Marlins have not.  The Athletic  reported on March 18, 2025 that the Marlins were operating about $20 million below the CBA’s revenue sharing player payroll spending requirement. [20]   Since the article was published, the Marlins have made no significant changes to their 2025 payroll.  What’s worse, the article suggests that the Marlins are more likely to cut  salary by the end of the season than add it.  For example, the article predicts that Sandy Alcantara, whose salary is approximately $11.2 million for 2025, will be traded by this season’s trade deadline. [21] This is not the first time similar allegations have been made against the Marlins (or the A’s).  In 2018, the MLBPA filed a grievance against the Miami Marlins, Oakland Athletics, Pittsburgh Pirates, and Tampa Bay Rays, alleging that these four Clubs violated the CBA by misusing the money they received through MLB’s revenue sharing program.  That grievance was filed pursuant to the then-operative CBA, which has since expired.  However, that CBA – like the current one – required Clubs to use the revenue sharing proceeds “in an effort to improve [their] performance on the field.”  That grievance remains pending, and the MLBPA filed another grievance against some of the same Clubs in 2019. [22] Potential consequences for the Marlins What will happen to the Marlins if they do not increase their payroll remains an open question.  As an initial matter, if the Marlins’ payroll does not exceed the 150% threshold by the end of the season, they can still show that they used their revenue sharing proceeds to improve their on-field performance.  Perhaps anticipating that their payroll would not exceed the 150% threshold, at the start of spring training, Marlins owner Bruce Sherman and president of baseball operations Peter Bendix discussed improvements the Marlins had made in the offseason, including hiring “one of the largest front-office staffs in baseball,” bulking up the Marlins weight room, renovating their spring training facility, and building a player development complex in the Dominican Republic. [23]   Notably, these are the exact types of improvements the Marlins would likely point to in a grievance hearing as evidence that they had used their revenue sharing proceeds to improve on-field performance.  Even if the grievance is successful, however, it is unclear what penalties would be levied against the Marlins.  Perhaps Commissioner Rob Manfred would require the Marlins to submit a plan for its financial performance and competitive effort for the next two years as the CBA contemplates.  It is also possible that the MLBPA will use the grievance as leverage while negotiating the next CBA, which will happen in the not-too-distant future, as the current CBA is set to expire on December 1, 2026.  Maybe even the Marlins don’t know what will happen if they don’t increase their payroll, and maybe they don’t care.  As one rival executive put it, “They’re sort of saying, ‘There’s no precedent here.  We don’t know what the punishment will be.  We’ll just find out’.” [24]   So will we.  John Kane is a lawyer and a sports fan.  His Twitter handle is @JKane_Sports. Sources: [1] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” Evan Drellich and Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic , December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ ; “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ . [2] CBA Article I.  [3]  CBA Article XI(A)(1)(a). [4] “MLB players union seeking $500 million in grievance against league,” Jon Sherman, New York Post , May 13, 20201, https://nypost.com/2021/05/13/mlb-players-union-seeks-500-million-in-grievance-against-league/ . [5]  “Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Trevor Bauer’s grievance hearing against Major League Baseball to begin May 23, sources say,” Alden Gonzalez, ESPN , May 13, 2022, https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/33910887/los-angeles-dodgers-pitcher-trevor-bauer-grievance-hearing-major-league-baseball-begin-23-source-says . [6]  “Settling the dispute,” Darren Rovell, ESPN , November 14, 2001, https://www.espn.com/mlb/s/2001/1113/1277749.html . [7]  CBA Article XI(B). [8]  532 U.S. 504 (2001). [9] Revenues from nationally broadcast games are split equally among all Clubs. [10] The revenue sharing program is not to be confused with the Competitive Balance Tax (the “ CBT ”), the tiered tax on Clubs who exceed certain payroll thresholds.  The proceeds of those taxes are used towards players’ benefits, retirement plans, and a fund that rewards local clubs for growing their non-media local revenue.  See  CBA Article XXIII((H)(2)(b). [11]  CBA Article XXIV(A)(9)-(10).   [12] “Rule 4 Draft,” https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/rule-4-draft (“[R]evenue sharing payees are ineligible to receive lottery selections in three consecutive years[.]”). [13] “A’s content with 11th pick, despite Draft Lottery ineligibility,” Martin Gallegos, MLB.com ,  https://www.mlb.com/news/athletics-land-11th-pick-after-being-ineligible-for-draft-lottery . [14] “Rule 4 Draft,” https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/rule-4-draft (“[N]on-payees are ineligible to receive lottery selections in consecutive years.”). [15]  CBA Article XXIV(B)(5)(a). [16]  CBA Article XXIV(B)(5)(a). [17]   Id. [18] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” The Athletic, December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ .  [19] https://www.fangraphs.com/roster-resource/payroll/athletics . [20] “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ .                [21] Id. [22] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” The Athletic, December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ .  [23] “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ . [24] Id.

On Thursday, March 27, 2025 , former University of Tennessee head coach Jeremy Pruitt filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, claiming he was used as a “sacrificial lamb” for conduct that has a long precedent in his career at the university. Pruitt alleges that the NCAA conspired with the university in a “one-sided” investigation, unfairly placing the blame on him for a series of violations that ultimately led to the loss of his job. Pruitt is seeking a substantial $100 million in damages. A History of Violations Pruitt’s lawsuit centers on the allegation that the University of Tennessee has a long history of violations that went unnoticed upon his hire in 2017. He claims that, within one week of obtaining his job, he reported violations to the athletic director, Phillip Fulmer. Pruitt’s complaint expresses that, with the understanding that payments were being made to some players, he made the report to Fulmer, and was told that Fulmer would “handle it” and “deal with the compliance department” at the university, but no substantial actions were taken to address the issue. The NCAA’s investigation from 2020-2023 found that, during official visits, two players received direct payments from Pruitt. One received a direct payment from Pruitt to include a $7,600 down payment for a car and a monthly payment of $500 for a car payment on at least 25 occasions. The NCAA discovered that another player received $3,000 to use for medical bills and expenses. Pruitt’s wife (who once worked in NCAA rules compliance at Troy University and Florida State) also allegedly made cash payments of at least $13,000 to recruits and their families. In 2021, Pruitt and seven staff members were charged with having committed violations, all of whom were fired from their positions after an internal university investigation uncovered alleged wrongdoing. NCAA’s Response and Penalties The NCAA has yet to respond; however, they did impose penalties on Tennessee’s program. In 2023, Pruitt was given a six-year show cause order, prohibiting him from being hired by NCAA-affiliated schools unless the school shows the NCAA why they should approve the hire. Although Tennessee avoided a postseason ban due to its compliance with the investigation, the university was placed on probation, forced to vacate wins, and suffered scholarship reductions. Pruitt’s Legal Claim Pruitt’s lawsuit alleges that the NCAA allowed the University of Tennessee to choose its own lawyers for the investigation, which placed him in an unfair position due to the biased process. He claims that the NCAA also applied "an erroneous and improper standard in weighing the evidence, the net effect of which was to allow a life-altering punishment with less than the required burden of proof." Additionally, Pruitt argues that the NCAA limited the investigation by excluding “ any facts that tend to show misconduct prior to Jeremy's time as head coach and outside his chain of authority." Pruitt expresses that the university acted in bad faith in order to preserve self-interest at the expense of his career and reputation and that no reasonable jury would be able to find him guilty of the allegations. The Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) Argument The widely discussed debate surrounding NIL is a focal point in this case. Pruitt argues that the NCAA punished Pruitt for something that is no longer illegal due to the results of NCAA v. Alston . Pruitt was fired from his position just within half a year before this ruling. With this small window between stepping down from the coaching position and the allowance of college players being able to profit from their name, image, and likeness, there is hope that this will help Pruitt’s case. Pruitt expresses the unfairness of the rules that the NCAA is applying against him, which “had been essentially abolished in 2021 by the United States Supreme Court ruling.” The Future of NCAA Enforcement: Is Pruitt’s Lawsuit a Turning Point? In this new NIL era reshaping collegiate sports, critical questions stem from this lawsuit in regard to the organization’s ability to enforce infractions. This lawsuit raises broader questions about the NCAA’s power to regulate recruiting violations in a time where monetary benefits for athletes are no longer strictly prohibited. As legal challenges to NCAA authority grow, this case could serve as a critical test of how much influence the organization retains over its member institutions and whether its enforcement mechanisms need reform .   Katherine Vescio is a 1L at University of Gonzaga School of Law. She can be found on LinkedIn .

A new bill  introduced by U.S. Rep. Michael Baumgartner (R-Wash.) takes aim  at the current college athletics landscape and proposes changes that target NIL, the transfer portal, and conference realignment. The bill, called the “Restore College Sports Act,” specifically targets  areas of college athletics that the Congressman identified as in need of reform. The legislation would dissolve the NCAA and replace it with a new entity, the American College Sports Association. The ACSA would be run by a commissioner, appointed by the President and approved by Congress, who would oversee and regulate college sports. The bill also calls for a new revenue sharing model for NIL funds, which would involve pooling national NIL revenues and redistributing them equally to all student-athletes across the nation. Broadcast revenue would also be distributed equally among ASCA member institutions. Additionally, student athletes would have the ability to transfer schools without penalty or restrictions. The bill further proposes that all athletic conferences would be required to have members operating in the same time zone, in an effort to prevent cross county travel for in-conference games. Baumgarter  asserts that this requirement would reduce travel burdens and prioritize the academic and physical well-being of the student-athletes. The legislation also addresses coaching salaries by essentially creating a cap that would limit the coaches salary to ten times the full cost of attendance for students at each institution. Baumgartner stated that his bill “reflected not only good policy, but good politics. . . The NCAA is a defunct and broken institution that nobody likes. You need to make elected officials accountable for these things, because it is in the public interest.”   Baumgartner’s bill is not the only legislation introduced in an effort to change college sports. Another bill , introduced by U.S. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-Mich.) would “prevent college athletes from being employees of their schools, conferences or an athletic association.” In 2023 , U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) introduced legislation to codify NIL rights in federal law. The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act emphasizes the rights and economic interests of college athletes. The bill proposes an unrestricted federal NIL right that the NCAA, conferences and colleges could not restrain; a requirements that media rights deal include group licenses on behalf of college athletes, who must be adequately compensated for their appearances; an amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow international college athletes attending colleges on F-1 visas to capitalize on their NIL without facing immigration consequences; and a prohibition of college and NIL collective practices that discriminate on the basis of gender, race, or sport. The same year, U.S. Senators Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) and Joe Manchin (D-W. Va). introduced their own NIL bill, the Protecting Athletes, Schools, and Sports Act of 2023, which contemplates a more restrictive landscape for athletes’ NIL opportunities and a limitation on the transfer portal.   Despite interest from both parties, it's unlikely an NIL bill will pass anytime soon. Murphy “estimated the chances of Congress passing NIL-related legislation before the end of 2026 are close to zero.”   Cassandra Devaney is a graduate of the University of Connecticut School of Law.

Seven members of the medical team that treated Diego Maradona are facing homicide charges in Buenos Aires. Maradona, who died in November 2020 at the age of 60, is regarded as one of the greatest football players of all time. He captained the Argentinian national team when they won the World Cup in 1986, scoring the infamous “Hand of God” goal in the quarter-finals.  The trial, which started last month, centers on allegations that medical negligence contributed to Maradona's death. Maradona had been home recovering from brain surgery, having undergone a procedure to remove a blood clot on his brain, when he suffered a heart attack. Maradona, a national icon, had long struggled with drug addiction, obesity, and alcoholism, but prosecutors argue that his death could have been prevented with proper medical care. The accusations emerged after the prosecutor’s office gathered a group of medical experts to determine if there was evidence that Maradona’s medical team committed a crime. The prosecutor’s group of medical experts released a report in 2021 accusing Maradona’s medical team of acting in an “inappropriate, deficient, and reckless manner,” ultimately concluding that the team’s failure to properly monitor Maradona after he was released from the hospital contributed to his death.  The accused include Maradona’s brain surgeon, psychiatrist, addiction specialist, and several nurses. Among the charges is "culpable homicide," a crime similar to involuntary manslaughter. The prosecution’s case includes expert reports and over 120,000 messages and audio recordings, highlighting deficiencies in Maradona’s care. The experts also pointed out that Maradona had not received necessary heart or lab tests and had symptoms of heart failure before his death. Despite this, the majority of the medical team has denied any wrongdoing. The defendants argue that Maradona insisted on home care and that his death was unforeseeable, occurring “during sleeping hours, without offering us any time.” In response to the medical experts report, the defense also commissioned its own forensic study to support their claim that Maradona’s death “was sudden and without agony.” However, this past week, a doctor testified at trial that the late soccer star should have been admitted to a rehab center after his release from the hospital, rather than taken home following the surgery he underwent. “He should have gone to a rehabilitation clinic ... a more protected place for him,” Mario Alejandro Schiter, who treated Maradona for two decades, told the court. Schiter said he was a consultant and that he had no decision-making authority, and that the clinic's directors ultimately “came and told me they opted for home hospitalization.” According to some witnesses at the trial, the home where Maradona was taken lacked the necessary medical equipment. Schiter, who also observed the autopsy on Maradona's body, said “all the evidence suggests that there was a failure to provide modifiable care, which led to heart failure.” The trial will continue through July, with a three-judge court rendering judgment on seven of the eight medical professionals accused - the eighth, a nurse, asked to be tried separately by a jury. If they are found guilty, the defendants face up to 25 years in prison. Cassandra Devaney is a graduate of the University of Connecticut School of Law. Sources: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2eg09e14do https://apnews.com/article/maradona-homicide-trial-doctors-fa75d5af559411da0809f8ad21de2974

Like in every professional sport, the margins between winning and losing in Major League Baseball are extremely thin. A single trade, free agent acquisition, managerial decision, or injury can play a significant role in whether a team makes the postseason or misses out by a game. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that every team seeks to find even the slightest competitive edge over their opponents.   As MLB front offices have evolved over the last several years, analytics have become a focal component of how rosters are built, prospects are scouted, and competitive advantages are gained. While front offices across the league have hired analysts, data scientists, and PhDs to keep up with this trend, clubs often make agreements with analytics companies as a supplement to their internal operations.     Because these analytic companies often have deals with multiple clubs within the same league, front offices are understandably concerned they are losing a potential competitive edge. To combat this, many clubs attempt to gain some level of exclusivity with these entities.   Just in the last decade, analytically forward front offices including the Tampa Bay Rays, Chicago Cubs, New York Yankees, and Houston Astros had exclusive arrangements with college programs to access their player’s TrackMan Data. MLB eventually halted this practice due to potential NCAA violations, but it goes to show how much teams crave to get ahead of their peers. According to Evan Drellich’s Winning Fixes Everything , the Houston Astros even considered buying TrackMan outright as they built up their analytics department under former GM Jeff Luhnow.   Therefore, it’s not surprising that there is some natural tension in these agreements between MLB clubs and analytical companies. The clubs don’t want to risk losing their competitive edge and the companies don’t want to limit their services to one particular club.   We saw this tension come to fruition recently when the Philadelphia Phillies filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Philadelphia against Zelus Analytics and its parent company Teamworks Innovations. In the suit, the team claimed Zelus attempted to sell components of the Titan Exchange platform to teams within their division, violating the agreement they had with the Phillies—and in effect, undermining its competitive advantage.  Titan Intelligence is made by Zelus and produces analytical models that help teams evaluate players and assist with roster construction, including player contracts and strategy. The Phillies paid Zelus $1.875 million from 2022-24 to use its Titan platform and those contracts included “division-exclusive” licenses that prevented Zelus from sharing data with any other National League East club.  Following the 2024 season, the agreement contained option for the parties to extend the deal through the 2025 campaign if the Phillies chose to do so. This is where the conflict emerged. Zelus stated the team stalled to exercise its $725,000 option for 2025 and that they did not have exclusive rights to individual components of the platform, which had been marketed to every team in the sport for months. The Phillies alleged that upon attempting to exercise their option, Zelus responded by attempting to amend the agreement so that they would be able to sell the platform in to more teams around the league, including to the team's division rivals.   The Phillies claimed they still possessed the “division-exclusive license,” and sought a temporary restraining order that would block any deal that would violate the team’s agreement with the firm to sell to just one team in each of Major League Baseball’s six divisions, in addition to unspecified compensatory damages for breach of contract.  The team argued that without court intervention, Zelus and Teamworks would have continued to try to get around their exclusivity agreement by selling parts of its platform to other teams, including its division foes, causing “irreparable harm” to the front office’s competitive advantage.  In response, the Zelus and Teamworks claimed that the lawsuit was merely "pretext for [the Phillies] to leverage the convenient imminency of the start of the 2025 MLB season to further its efforts to negotiate a price reduction on a renewal contract.” They contended the Phillies could not claim irreparable harm or a loss of competitive advantage because one of the club’s assistant general managers proposed a financial discount during the negotiations if the Phillies were to permit other teams to purchase components of the platform.” Finally, Zelus and Teamworks argued the Phillies’ contention of “irreparable harm” was based on speculation about competitive infringements. “[The Phillies] have failed to provide any actual proof of irreparable harm by way of concrete evidence,” Teamworks attorneys wrote. “And for good reason, because no such proof exists.” Judge James Crumlish III of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sided with the defendants and denied the Phillies’ injunctive request, stating that the team failed to “show that its claims of injury were anything but entirely speculative.”  Moreover, Crumlish wrote that the Phillies failed to demonstrate “requisite diligence in seeking relief,” suggesting they implied this was an emergency situation when it wasn’t. Crumlish, however, will allow the Phillies' breach of contract lawsuit against Zelus to proceed.   Obviously frustrated by the lack of immediate injuctive relief, the Phillies issued a statement that read: “The Phillies are disappointed with the Court’s decision, which contains numerous errors of fact and law,” and “We look forward to prevailing on the merits of our case in front of a Philadelphia jury.”   On the other side, a Teamworks spokesman said, “We are pleased the court has denied the Philadelphia Phillies’ effort to prevent rival organizations from accessing our advanced analytics products,” and “While we cannot comment on specific details of ongoing litigation, we remain confident we have acted in full compliance with our agreements and look forward to an appropriate resolution.”   Moving forward, this case will proceed without the temporary restraining order in federal court. It will certainly be interesting to see if the parties are willing to take this dispute to trial or ultimately end up settling out of court. More broadly, given that the Phillies are only one of Zelus' MLB clients, it certainly adds another layer of intrigue to the resolution of this case.     Brendan Bell is a 2L at SMU Dedman School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @_bbell5

The sight of fans collapsing in tears of joy after their team secures the World Cup. The stories of Olympic medals catapulting once-unknown athletes into national icons. For many athletes, representing their country on the international stage is the pinnacle of their playing journey—the fruits of countless hours on the field and in the weight room, finally coming to bear. Yet, this dream can quickly turn horrific. Recent cases highlight how the interests of club and international teams compete with one another, sometimes resulting in devastating consequences for the very athletes they depend on.   Just over a week ago, Bayern Munich football star and Canadian national Alphonso Davies suffered a torn ACL during the third-place match of the CONCACAF Nations League tournament against the United States. The injury itself was crushing, but it became even more controversial when Davies’ agent, Nedal Huoseh, stated that his client was not fully healthy after Canada’s prior match against Mexico. According to Huoseh, the Canadian captain—who missed the November international window due to fatigue—first planned to come off the bench before ultimately succumbing to pressures from his coach and joining the starting lineup. While the Canadian soccer federation denied wrongdoing, the team’s decision to play their star player in a relatively meaningless game (particularly when they’ve already secured an advantageous World Cup bid as a host nation) has been questioned by fans and experts alike. Bayern’s chief executive, Jan-Christian Dreesen, has since threatened legal action against the Canadian federation, accusing the team of being grossly negligent and violating medical due diligence by sending Davies back on a twelve-hour flight to Germany without a proper medical evaluation. Ironically, Bayern themselves faced similar accusations from the South Korean national team head coach after a recent injury to another player, Kim Min-jae. Davies is now facing “several months” of recovery, potentially jeopardizing his hopes of playing in the 2026 World Cup.          These issues are not unique to football, either. In the NHL’s midseason ‘4 Nations Face-Off,’ which featured a tournament-style competition between four national hockey teams, Boston Bruins star defenseman and U.S. national team member Charlie McAvoy suffered a shoulder injury in a preliminary match against Sweden. He was given treatment and cleared by the Team USA medical staff—comprised of members of the Minnesota Wild’s medical team—playing in the following game against Team Canada. However, McAvoy developed increasing pain, and upon returning to the Bruins for further evaluation by the club’s medical staff (as opposed to that of Team USA), it was discovered that McAvoy had a shoulder infection and significant injury to his AC joint that required hospitalization. The Bruins were publicly displeased with how McAvoy’s injury was handled, reigniting tensions between Boston and Minnesota’s medical teams (who had previously disagreed over player health). This history highlights a fundamental issue for international athletes: national teams and club teams often have separate medical staffs, each operating with entirely different priorities. While Team USA’s doctors were focused on short-term tournament success, the Bruins—who have McAvoy under contract through 2029–30—were concerned about the long-term health of their franchise cornerstone. While Team USA has faced no ramifications, the Bruins have been without a key player since February 8, a significant blow to a team whose only “fault” was allowing one of their players to compete internationally.   Club teams may not be completely without recourse when one of their players suffers an international injury. Bodies like FIFA provide insurance policies covering injuries sustained while on national team duty, awarding up to $7.5 million per case. However, such protections are far from universal. While the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) insured players for the 2018 Winter Olympics, they did extend the same coverage for the 4 Nations tournament. The NHL has since informed the IIHF they will not be moving forward with their partnership for the 2028 World Cup of Hockey, leaving club teams to bear the financial and competitive burden of losing players to international injury. This lack of insurance means that while clubs in some sports may receive compensation for injured players, many others are left with no course of action.   Despite mounting concerns of player burnout from players and fans alike, governing bodies continue to push for expanded schedules. FIFA is adding matches to an already congested calendar, including the upcoming 2025 Club World Cup. Meanwhile, the NBA and NFL are exploring ways to integrate international competitions into their seasons. Although leagues have resisted the idea that additional rest may reduce injury—most notably the NBA’s recent changes to their rest policies—the effects of overuse are becoming undeniable. Stars across sports have seen their rate of injury increase following a 2024 Olympics that saw many players take on an increased workload necessitated by added international games. Adding further matches and travel to an already busy schedule would seemingly only cause the rate of injury to spike further, prompting concern for the long-term health and safety of players in this current climate.   Solutions do exist for teams and players alike who want to insulate their bodies against the rigors of being both a modern international and club-level athlete, though implementation remains a challenge. The WNBA’s recent “prioritization” rules (designed to limit athletes’ offseason and international play) have faced pushback from players. Greater club discretion is needed to prevent teams from losing star talent to serious international injury without compensation, as the Bruins now face with McAvoy. Even when teams can pursue insurance claims and litigation (as in the Davies case), those measures do nothing to reduce growing player workloads or prevent the injuries in the first place—leading to athletes losing valuable years of their careers. Allegations by Davies’ agent that he was pressured into playing also underscore a need for player autonomy and discretion in deciding whether they feel healthy enough to take the field. More immediate solutions could include an adjustment of the standard player contract (SPC) that is available in many professional leagues (and typically sanctions certain events that are deemed as high-risk to players) to explicitly preclude participation in international matches if the player is deemed medically unfit (or introducing robust return-to-play protocols). Implementing such safeguards would appear to be a necessary first step to soothing growing overuse injury concerns athletes face as they balance demanding schedules for club and country.   As sports organizations worldwide chase record viewership numbers by increasing player workloads and scheduling added matches, the divide between national sports federations and club teams has never been wider. Conflicting medical assessments, limited player autonomy, and relentless scheduling demands are pushing athletes beyond their limits, often with insufficient protection for players and clubs. The question remains: will teams and leagues learn from these contemporary lessons and adopt proactive legislative shifts to safeguard their players, or will it take a career-ending injury to a global superstar to finally force change?   Oliver Canning is a 2L at the University of Miami School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @OCanning and found on LinkedIn .