Engineering Integrity: Tanking, Commissioner Power, and the NBA’s Draft Incentive Dilemma

Over the past few weeks, the league fined the Utah Jazz $500,000 and the Indiana Pacers $100,000 for conduct it deemed detrimental to the league. In Indiana’s case, the issue centered on player participation in a February 3 loss to Utah. Indiana held out three starters (Pascal Siakam, Andrew Nembhard, and Aaron Nesmith) on the second night of a back-to-back. Following an investigation that included review by an independent physician, the NBA concluded that the players could have participated under the policy’s medical standard, including potentially playing reduced minutes. The league also stated that the team could have structured the absences differently across other games to remain compliant with the policy.

In Utah’s case, it was fourth-quarter substitution patterns involving Lauri Markkanen and Jaren Jackson Jr. in games against the Orlando Magic and Miami Heat. According to the NBA, the Jazz removed Lauri Markkanen and Jaren Jackson Jr. from those games despite both players being able to continue playing and with the outcomes still in doubt. The league concluded the decision prioritized developmental and roster-management considerations over competitive integrity, which it classified as “conduct detrimental to the league.”

With the 2026 draft class widely viewed as elite, the incentives for teams to engage in this form of tanking are obvious. However, the legal questions are far more complicated.

Commissioner Adam Silver has reportedly been “forceful” with general managers about addressing tanking, and the league is considering structural reforms for next season: freezing lottery odds at the trade deadline, prohibiting consecutive top-four picks, allocating odds based on two-year records, and limiting pick protections to certain bands. These are not cosmetic tweaks. They are fundamental changes to how competitive incentives are engineered.

From a sports law perspective, this is about governance power, collectively bargained rights, and evidentiary processes.

Start with the player participation policy, adopted in 2023 and primarily aimed at “star players.” The policy empowers an independent physician to review medical documentation and determine whether a player could participate without substantial risk. But it also contains a broader clause giving the commissioner authority to penalize teams for non-participation deemed “prejudicial or detrimental” to the NBA. That language is sweeping. It mirrors the traditional “conduct detrimental” standard seen across major leagues and has historically survived challenges because of the commissioner’s broad, collectively bargained discretion.

Yet the Pacers’ situation introduces a procedural wrinkle. Coach Rick Carlisle publicly questioned the investigative process, alleging that the league relied on a medical review that did not include direct examination by team physicians. According to Carlisle, the league determined that Siakam (who qualifies as a “star player” under the policy) and two other starters were healthy enough to play in some capacity under the policy’s medical standard by using a review of medical records instead of examining the supposedly injured players directly. In response, the NBA maintained that an independent physician led the review and that Pacers team executives were also interviewed. If this dispute escalates, it raises due process-adjacent questions within the CBA framework: What constitutes a sufficient medical review? How much deference is owed to team doctors? And how transparent must the league be when applying competitive integrity standards?

Then there’s the draft lottery itself. Tanking is not a rules violation in the abstract. Teams are allowed to rebuild. They are allowed to prioritize development. They are allowed to manage minutes. The line the NBA is trying to police is “overt behavior” that prioritizes draft position over winning. But that line is inherently subjective.

The more discretion the league asserts, the more it risks tension with the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), particularly if players feel pressured to play through injuries to satisfy competitive optics. Any structural reform to lottery odds or pick eligibility will almost certainly implicate collectively bargained provisions. Even if the league has authority to modify certain competitive mechanics, meaningful changes that affect player movement value and draft economics could invite NBPA scrutiny.

There’s also the trade overlay. Indiana’s top-four protected 2026 first-round pick (sent to the Los Angeles Clippers in the Ivica Zubac deal) creates a rational incentive to finish in the bottom tier. When protection structures are legal, disclosed, and strategically rational, is maximizing lottery odds truly “conduct detrimental”? Or is it front-office optimization within the rules as written?

This is the central paradox. The NBA designed flattened lottery odds to discourage tanking. It created a player participation policy to protect national broadcasts and competitive optics. Now it is contemplating further reforms because teams continue to respond rationally to draft incentives.

You can fine behavior. You can adjust odds. You can restrict consecutive top picks. But unless the incentive structure changes in a way that aligns long-term team value with short-term competitiveness, tanking will remain a feature, not a bug.

The legal battle isn’t just about whether a player could have played 18 minutes on the second night of a back-to-back. It’s about how far a commissioner’s “integrity of the game” power extends in an era of sophisticated roster management and asset engineering.

Competitive integrity is a foundational principle. So is collectively bargained discretion. The NBA is now stress-testing both at the same time.

Oliver Canning is a 3L at the University of Miami School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @OCanning and found on LinkedIn.